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I. Introduction 
To say that pharmaceuticals enjoy near-total products 
liability immunity may invite an eyebrow or two to rise. The 
industry does not think of itself as immune from anything, and 
alarms about what products liability does to it have filled news 
reports for decades.1 One important American newspaper 
regularly runs editorials about liability devastating the sector.2 
Almost every major manufacturer has shelled out millions in 
Department of Justice settlements—some have paid more—for 
misconduct related to the marketing of a prescription drug.3 Add 
scandals,4 bad press,5 alarm about the death of innovation,6 and 
                                                                                                     
 1. See Han W. Choi & Jae Hong Lee, Pharmaceutical Product Liability, in 
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES OF PHARMACEUTICAL MEDICINE 688, 688 (Lionel D. 
Edwards et al. eds., 2011) (observing that “[p]roducts liability actions against 
pharmaceutical companies are among the most widely publicized classes of suits 
in the United States and Europe”). 
 2. See Fighting a Tort Plague, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 2019, at A16 
(discussing an improper drug warning label case pending before the Supreme 
Court); More Lawsuits = Higher Drug Prices, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 2018, at A18 
(expressing the view that more prescription drug litigation raises the cost of 
prescription drugs). 
 3. See infra Part II.A. 
 4. See, e.g., Gardiner Harris & Duff Wilson, Glaxo to Pay $750 Million for 
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throw in a multibillion-dollar opioid crisis whose consequences in 
the law have commenced to round out a picture of the 
prescription drug industry in today’s United States.7 Prescription 
drugs are indeed deemed unacceptably bad in numerous venues, 
including popular discourse8 and the boardrooms where decisions 
                                                                                                     
Sale of Bad Products, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2010), https://perma.cc/6HFS-RKFH 
(last visited Nov. 2, 2019) (reporting on drug giant GlaxoSmithKline’s operation 
of a plant in Puerto Rico that produced contaminated antidepressants, diabetes 
medications, and acid reflux drugs) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 5. See, e.g., John LaMattina, Pharma’s Reputation Continues to  
Suffer— What Can Be Done to Fix It?, FORBES (Jan. 18, 2013, 8:27 AM), 
https://perma.cc/X4PY-YLB8 (last visited Nov. 2, 2019) (attributing a lack of 
transparency in corporate activities and prioritizing profits over fair pricing 
practices to the pharmaceutical industry’s poor reputation) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).   
 6. See, e.g., Clifton Leaf, How Stale Is Innovation in Drug Discovery? 
Think: 5-Year-Old Yogurt, FORTUNE (Mar. 6, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/Y9A6-NDDN (last visited Nov. 2, 2019) (pointing out that on 
average, thirty large and small biotech companies got just eleven percent of 
their 2017 revenue from drugs developed within the past five years) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also infra Part IV.D.1 (discussing 
investors’ frustrations with limited innovation in the development of new 
antibiotics).  
 7. This crisis has not yet manifested much accountability for the sector. 
See BARRY MEIER, PAIN KILLER: AN EMPIRE OF DECEIT AND THE ORIGIN OF 
AMERICA’S OPIOID EPIDEMIC 155–72 (2d ed. 2018) (corroborating this 
proposition); see also Rebecca L. Haffajee & Michelle M. Mello, Drug Companies’ 
Liability for the Opioid Epidemic, 377 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2301, 2305 (2017) 
(observing that “opioid litigation has yet to financially dent the 
$13-billion-a-year opioid industry” and that opioid litigation “victories have all 
taken the form of settlements”). See generally Richard C. Ausness, The Current 
State of Opioid Litigation, 70 S.C. L. REV. 565 (2019) (provisioning a thorough 
and recent review of case law grouped under “opioid litigation” that omits 
personal injury actions altogether, confining itself to actions initiated by 
governments); Anita Bernstein, Formed by Thalidomide: Mass Torts as a False 
Cure for Toxic Exposure, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2153 (1997) (concluding that units of 
government are safer than human plaintiffs from attacks on their prudence and 
entitlements to collect money); Jef Feeley, Drugmakers Balk at Funding Opioid 
Epidemic Fix; Counting on Court Wins, INS. J. (May 4, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/4AUP-YJST (last visited Oct. 12, 2019) (explaining that “[d]rug 
companies are in no rush to finance a solution to the opioid epidemic,” 
preferring “to take their chances in court rather than pay billions of dollars to 
settle lawsuits blaming them for addictions”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 8. See Alison Kodjak, Poll: Americans Support Government Action to Curb 
Prescription Drug Prices, NPR (Mar. 1, 2019), https://perma.cc/K6EN-8SC8 (last 
visited Nov. 2, 2019) (discussing a nonpartisan poll which concluded that “a 
6 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2020) 
to withdraw or pay up for injurious products get made.9   
Affronting genteel museums in New York and London so much 
that they turn down cash money is hard for a rich donor to do, 
but the opioid-profiteering Sackler family pulled off this dubious 
achievement in 2019 when the stench of its notorious prescription 
drug, OxyContin, grew too severe to overlook.10 Law-based 
adversities that the drug sector continues to experience include 
product recalls,11 criminal and civil penalties for violating the 
False Claims Act,12 and governmental refusals to approve new 
                                                                                                     
majority [of Americans] welcome government action to help cut the cost of 
medications” because they think prescription drug prices are too high) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 9. See Angelica LaVito, Johnson & Johnson Faces a Crucial Hearing 
Monday over Thousands of Talc Baby Powder Lawsuits, CNBC (July 22, 2019, 
10:52 AM), https://perma.cc/N858-CGJZ (last updated July 22, 2019, 2:23 PM) 
(last visited Nov. 2, 2019) (noting that it was Johnson & Johnson’s decision to 
fight charges against it in court) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).   
  10. See Elizabeth A. Harris, The Met Will Turn Down Sackler Money amid 
Fury over the Opioid Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2019), https://perma.cc/8FJP-
HZZ7 (last visited Oct. 12, 2019) (reporting that the Metropolitan Museum of 
Art in New York City was going to “stop accepting gifts from members of the 
Sackler family linked to the maker of OxyContin” and that the Tate Modern in 
London and the Solomon R. Guggenheim in New York City had taken similar 
steps to distance themselves from the family) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review); Alex Marshall, Museums Cut Ties with the Sacklers as 
Outrage over Opioid Crisis Grows, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/NYA8-Q79M (last visited Oct. 12, 2019) (reporting that 
Britain’s National Portrait Gallery decided to cancel a planned $1.3 million 
donation from longtime Sackler benefactors) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review); Soo Youn, NYU Langone No Longer Accepting Donations from 
the Sacklers, the Family that Owns Oxycontin Maker Purdue Pharma, 
ABCNEWS (June 12, 2019, 2:57 PM), https://perma.cc/QT76-CW3Z (last visited 
Oct. 12, 2019) (“NYU Langone Health now says it is no longer taking money 
from the [Sackler] family — and it says it is ‘evaluating’ whether its Sackler 
Institute of Graduate Biomedical Sciences will hold on to its name.”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 11.  See, e.g., Sheila Kaplan, Blood Pressure Medicine is Recalled, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 16, 2018), https://perma.cc/C54Y-EE7G (last visited Oct. 18, 2019) 
(announcing the recall of a prescription blood pressure medicine by the Food and 
Drug Administration) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 12. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2018). See, e.g., Katie Thomas, Insys, the 
Opioid Drug Maker, to Pay $225 Million to Settle Fraud Charges, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 5, 2019), https://perma.cc/C5G6-ZURV (last visited Oct. 18, 2019) 
(covering opioids manufacturer Insys Therapeutics’ $225 million settlement for 
a False Claims Act violation) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
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drug applications and marketing strategies.13 The locus of this 
Article, however, is liability — products liability in  
particular—where a court concludes that a manufactured object 
is defective or could be called defective by a factfinder following a 
trial. Drug manufacturers enjoy near-immunity from this 
consequence. This simple fact on the products liability ground 
continues to escape notice.  
In clarifying an ill-understood state of the law, this Article 
holds back on overt condemnation of what it observes. Skepticism 
about the fit between products liability and prescription drugs 
certainly could be defended. Judges and juries competent enough 
to assess a more mundane product—a Coke bottle14 or a power 
tool marketed to home hobbyists,15 for example—might be 
unsuited to the task of determining defectiveness of a 
prescription drug. Instead of lamenting the absence of products 
liability redress for injured drug consumers, this Article pursues 
transparency about what it reports. 
Transparent legal immunity for product-caused harm has 
elsewhere been attained. For example, Congress has chosen to 
block tort redress for persons injured by gun shootings and for 
municipalities that spend money on gun emergency services.16 
Closer to our subject, Congress enacted an alternative 
                                                                                                     
 13.  See, e.g., Adam Feuerstein, Sarepta Stumbles on FDA Rejection of a 
New Drug to Treat Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy, STAT NEWS (Aug. 19, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/P63P-MFCJ (last visited Nov. 2, 2019) (detailing the FDA’s 
rejection of a market application for a second drug that aimed to treat children 
with a rare muscle-wasting disease) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 14.  See generally Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944) 
(involving a products liability claim against a bottling manufacturer for an 
exploding bottle of Coke).  
    15.  See generally Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 
1963) (en banc) (involving a defective power tool that could be used as a saw, 
drill, or wood lathe). 
 16.  See Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901–03 
(2018)  
[A] purpos[e] of this chapter [is] as follows: to prohibit causes of 
action against manufacturers, distributors, and importers of firearms 
or ammunition products, and their trade associations, for the harm 
solely caused by the criminal or unlawful misuse of firearm products 
or ammunition products by others when the product functioned as 
designed and intended. 
8 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2020) 
compensation scheme for harms linked to vaccines.17 Agree or 
disagree with legislative decisions to insulate guns and vaccines 
from products liability, one can look up the particulars of these 
shelters. They state what they forbid and permit. Activists who 
succeeded in getting these exceptions enacted know what they 
achieved; opponents who wish to undo or modify these reforms 
understand what they have to change; injured persons can try to 
work around their barrier to redress.18 
The prescription-drug version of immunity is different. 
Foremost, it is not absolute. All doctrinal tickets to court 
available for injuries by other products exist in principle for this 
one, and American courts are ostensibly willing to hear 
complaints that use any doctrine available elsewhere in products 
liability.19  
Modern products liability identifies three categories of 
product defect;20 courts insulate drug manufacturers from 
responsibility for all three.21 The simplest type of defect is the 
manufacturing kind, where the product as made and sold did not 
conform to what its maker intended. Lapses of this kind are 
rare.22 When a lapse occurs, it is trivial—cheap to defend, I 
                                                                                                     
 17.  See National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 et seq. 
(2018) (establishing “the National Vaccine Injury Compensation 
Program . . . under which compensation may be paid for a vaccine-related injury 
or death”). 
 18.  See, e.g., Soto v. Bushmaster Firearms Int’l, LLC, No. 
FBTCV156048103S, 2016 WL 8115354, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 14, 2016), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 202 A.3d 262 (Conn. 2019), and cert. denied, 
Remington Arms Co. v. Soto, No. 19-168, 2019 WL 5875142, at *1 (U.S. 2019) 
(offering a novel application of negligent entrustment). 
 19.  See generally Freeman v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 618 N.W.2d 827 
(Neb. 2000) (engaging with seven distinct liability doctrines). 
 20.  See DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 534–52 (2d ed. 2005) 
(summarizing the three types of product defects—manufacturing flaws, design 
flaws, and insufficient warnings of danger and instructions on safe use). 
 21.   Id. at 549; see also Aaron D. Twerski, The Demise of Drug Design 
Litigation: Death by Federal Preemption, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 281, 281 (2018) 
(explaining that manufacturers of generic drugs are insulated from failure to 
warn and design defect claims). 
 22.  Manufacturing defects are rare in part because drug-sector regulators 
impose quality standards that demand care in manufacture. See STEVEN 
GARBER, ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF PRODUCT LIABILITY AND OTHER LITIGATION 18 
(2013) (noting that although manufacturing defect claims are uncommon, 
several were brought against drug manufacturers in the late 2000s). Every now 
and then a manufacturing plant runs into trouble with the FDA over quality 
(ALMOST) NO BAD DRUGS 9 
mean—because it injures only one unfortunate victim at a time. 
Plaintiffs impugn a deviation, not an entire line. 
Because the next two types of defect are found in every unit 
that rolls into commerce, judicial willingness to accept either of 
them matters to manufacturers. Fortunately for them, courts are 
hostile to both defective design and defective warning claims. The 
former hostility is better known than the latter: scholars steadily 
report that design defect is almost unavailable to drug 
plaintiffs.23 As Part II will soon document: yes indeed. The 
doomed nature of warning claims in drug products liability 
litigation is a subtler condition, but here too plaintiffs seldom 
succeed.  
By any quantitative measure, plaintiff victories in drug 
litigation add up to insignificance. Manufacturing defects rarely 
happen and when they occur they have no impact on defendants’ 
bottom line. Design defects almost never exist, as far as courts 
are concerned, and warning defects only slightly less infrequently 
exist. The next Parts build an explanation for this near-total 
immunity in two stages.  
Manufacturer-friendly doctrine reviewed in Part III offers a 
necessary start, but it is only the first pass. “Because two 
Restatements favor manufacturers,” “because preemption does 
the same,” and “because causation is a high hurdle for plaintiffs” 
are not enough to explain near-total immunity.24 They are true 
statements, but where did these stances come from? All have 
been resisted in litigation, scholarship, and Restatement fights 
inside the American Law Institute.25 These struggles all could 
                                                                                                     
control. See R.D. McDowall, Quality Assurance Implications for Computerized 
Systems Following the Able Laboratories Inspection, 10 QUALITY ASSURANCE J. 
15 (2006) (reporting that Able Labs ceased manufacturing operations, recalled 
its entire product line, and withdrew seven abbreviated new drug applications 
for failing to comply with regulations following an FDA inspection). 
 23.  See OWEN, supra note 20, at 549 (suggesting that for purposes of 
products liability, drug design defects “simply [don’t] matter”); see also Twerski, 
supra note 21, at 304 (writing that “drug design . . . has played only a minor role 
in drug litigation”). 
 24.  See infra Part III (discussing insulations from liability for drug 
manufacturers and barriers to redress for plaintiffs). 
 25.  See infra Part III.A (discussing Restatement disagreements within the 
American Law Institute; infra Part III.B (exploring the role of federal 
preemption in prescription drug products liability cases); infra Part III.C 
(examining the role of causation as an element in a prescription drug products 
10 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2020) 
have come out more favorably to consumers and plaintiffs. The 
drug sector scores low on popularity,26 and numerous individuals 
get hurt by what it so profitably sells, the (relatively) rich and 
powerful pill-swallowing American senior citizenry prominent 
among them.27 Why do judges, legislators, and attentive members 
of the public consistently let it win in court?  
The current state of the law, I will argue, appears healthier 
than it really is because unexamined premises about the 
no-liability status quo sound plausible and soothing. Figurative 
pillars expounded on in Part IV hold up a barely-seen exception 
to accountability under the law. Prescription drugs look worthier 
of indulgence than other products, I contend, because they 
purport to increase welfare beyond the satisfaction of individual 
preferences. 
Non-drug products warrant very little approval beyond the 
pleasure they give their users. If you like your ladder, shampoo 
brand, video game, power tool, automobile and so on, that’s nice, 
but the rest of us have scant reason to care about the possibility 
that this object of your affection will leave the market for any 
reason, including too much liability. What you want to remain 
available for your purchase until you move on to something else 
holds value for you, but not necessarily for others.  
 Drugs are different.28 In contrast to other products that 
purport only to give buyers what they want, this genre purports 
to give every one of us what we need. Judgments that transfer 
money to individuals at the expense of a savior-sector seem 
perverse. From there, a deferential-to-manufacturers consensus 
                                                                                                     
liability cases).  
 26.  See Robert Cyran, Big Pharma on the Hot Seat, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 
2017), https://perma.cc/NLA6-MUEX (last visited Oct. 20, 2019) (explaining that 
high prescription drug prices have made the pharmaceutical industry unpopular 
with the vast majority of Americans) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 27.  On wealth held by the age cohort likely to take prescription drugs, see 
The Rising Age Gap in Economic Well-being, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 7, 2011), 
https://perma.cc/2SNE-27YB (last visited Oct. 20, 2019) (observing that over the 
last quarter-century, “[t]he [o]ld [h]ave [p]rosper[ed] [r]elative to the [y]oung”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 28.  See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Drug Designs Are 
Different, 111 YALE L.J. 151, 168 (2001) (advocating an approach that takes the 
consumer interests of all potential patients into account, not just the welfare of 
those helped by a particular drug’s proper prescription and consumption). 
(ALMOST) NO BAD DRUGS 11 
has emerged and holds steady. Part IV of this Article, which like 
the preceding Part includes the word “questionable” in its 
heading, explores four beliefs about supposed 
pharma-benevolence that appear shared by more than the 
industry, reaching the level almost of conventional wisdom. The 
figurative pillars help support one-sided results in court. As this 
Part elaborates, all four need attention. Every one of the pillars 
on examination turns out at least a bit shaky. Putting them 
forward for review starts a necessary discussion. 
II. Case Law Reports Almost No Wins for Plaintiffs 
Phrases like “almost no wins” and “near-total immunity” call 
for attention to a numerator and denominator.29 For this purpose, 
the numerator is the number of wins in decisional law for 
plaintiffs—a win defined tolerantly as any judicial decision in 
which a court in the United States allowed an allegation of any 
kind of defect that would cover all manufactured units of a 
prescription drug (that is to say, design defect or warning defect) 
to reach a jury. The denominator is the total number of 
prescription drugs on the American market within reach of 
products liability. For different reasons, both numbers elude 
precise count. Enough information exists, however, to support a 
bottom-line conclusion: The ratio between the numerator and 
denominator is tiny—not zero wins for plaintiffs, but almost 
none.30 
                                                                                                     
 29.  See generally Eugene Kontorovich & Steven Art, An Empirical 
Examination of Universal Jurisdiction for Piracy, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 436 (2010) 
(using this approach to study how often the international crime of piracy is 
prosecuted). 
 30.  Several readers of this Article have commented that good results for 
plaintiffs extend beyond the “wins” or “numerator” that I have gathered. In an 
era of the so-called vanishing trial, almost all the action in litigation certainly 
occurs in settlements rather than outcomes that judges publish. See generally 
Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related 
Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004) 
(discussing the decline in the number of cases resolved by a jury trial in the 
United States). Moreover, as Neil Cohen has reasonably queried, what if the 
quality of prescription drugs is good? Even a tiny numerator could be too large 
in relation to the merits of contentions about defect. I agree. Yet even in a 
settlement perspective, it still bears notice that drug plaintiffs very seldom 
prevail in actions an outsider like me can know about—if only because limited 
12 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2020) 
A. Cases That Could Qualify as Plaintiff Wins 
No tallies undertake to count drug products liability actions 
decided in American courts. Aided by research assistants, I 
combed two broad sources of data: First, judicial decisions as 
gathered in Westlaw (including those classified as both published 
and unpublished), and second, the copyrighted text Drugs in 
Litigation, a compendium first published in 1976 and regularly 
updated on Lexis.31 The first search worked with variations on 
familiar search terms—drug, prescription, product, design, 
warning, defect, pharmaceutical, liability—that we repeated until 
this jargon ceased to yield new hits. Drugs in Litigation lists 
names of pharmaceutical products in alphabetical order. Each of 
the two sources yielded cases not found in the other.  
Neither Drugs in Litigation nor the Westlaw searches done 
for this Article put an age limit on materials eligible for inclusion, 
but the oldest cases present in both sources were decided in the 
1970s. This result is consistent with the emergence of robust 
modern products liability during that decade,32 and the scarcity 
until then of judicial decisions featuring drug-manufacturer 
defendants in particular. Courts did not instantly follow bold 
midcentury innovation from California and the American Law 
Institute on products liability,33 and they added another level of 
delay before putting prescription drugs in the category.34 
                                                                                                     
success in court drives down the value of claims that negotiation resolves. See 
Uri Weiss, The Regressive Effect of Legal Uncertainty, 2019 J. DISP. RESOL. 149, 
150–51 (2019) (discussing possible systematic biases). 
 31.  See RICHARD PATTERSON, DRUGS IN LITIGATION: DAMAGE AWARDS 
INVOLVING PRESCRIPTION AND NONPRESCRIPTION DRUGS (Matthew Bender ed., 
2018) (providing a “compilation of personal injury cases involving adverse 
reactions of prescription and nonprescription drugs” for legal and medical 
professionals).  
 32.  See OWEN, supra note 20 at 23 (remarking that 1965 was “the birth of 
modern products liability law in America”).   
 33.  Most states did not adopt strict products liability as first recognized in 
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963), until several 
years after the Restatement (Second) of Torts formally set forth the doctrine in 
1965. See, e.g., Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 470 P.2d 240, 243 (Haw. 
1970) (“Although this court has never had the occasion to rule on this matter, it 
is the modern tread and the better reasoned view that strict liability in tort is a 
sound legal basis for recovery in products liability cases.”); Johnson v. Am. 
Motors Corp., 225 N.W.2d 57, 66 (N.D. 1974) (“The status of the law . . . may be 
best clarified by the express adoption of the rule of strict liability in tort, as set 
(ALMOST) NO BAD DRUGS 13 
Some of the cases that turned up in the first haul ended up 
deleted. I removed vaccine cases from the tally because Congress 
went on to take this product out of the reach of products 
liability.35 Also on the cutting-room floor landed cases from Drugs 
in Litigation where the drug in litigation was non-prescription; 
pro-plaintiff decisions that went on to be reversed; and decisions 
where courts focused on the culpability of individuals to the 
exclusion of attention to the drug. The much-cited Lance v. 
Wyeth,36 in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court made a rare 
choice to let a design defect claim survive, left the roster because 
the FDA had hustled the defective drug (a constituent of the 
notorious fen-phen) from the market nine years before the 
plaintiff filed her action:37 Lance fell under the label of moot. 
This preamble in place, approximately thirty brand names of 
drugs can stand for plaintiff wins in the sense that at least one 
injured person convinced a court to permit a claim of design 
defect or warning defect to survive summary judgment, and that 
decision in the plaintiff’s favor was not overruled: Accutane,38 
Androgel,39 Bendectin,40 Chymopapain,41 Clomid,42 Delalutin,43 
                                                                                                     
forth in § 402A [of the Restatement of Torts] . . . .”); West v. Caterpillar Tractor 
Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 87 (Fla. 1976) (“We adopt the doctrine of strict liability as 
stated by the . . . Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A.”). 
 34.  Cf. Paul D. Rheingold, The Expanding Liability of the Product Supplier: 
A Primer, 2 HOFSTRA L. REV. 521, 533 n.34 (1974) (arguing that the plaintiffs’ 
bar got lucky in the 1960s when one defendant, Sterling Drug, persisted in 
appealing “a rather losing set of facts” in multiple courts, generating decisions 
that nurtured the fledgling doctrine of failure to warn). 
 35.  See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 36.  85 A.3d 434 (Pa. 2014). 
 37.  See id. at 437 (confirming that in September 1997, the FDA had 
announced that the drug at issue “would no longer be made available in the 
United States” and characterizing the personal injury and wrongful death 
lawsuits that followed as “a tidal wave of litigation”).   
 38.  Freeman v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 618 N.W.2d 827, 846 (Neb. 2000). 
 39.  In re Testosterone Replacement Therapy Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 14 C 
1748MDL No. 2545, 2017 WL 2313201, at *7–11, (N.D. Ill. May 29, 2017).  
 40.  Bendectin is a doubtful win. The plaintiff did prevail in Mekdeci v. 
Merrell National Laboratories, 711 F.2d 1510 (11th Cir. 1983) but subsequent 
decisional law, especially Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmacuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 
1311, (9th Cir. 1995), dealt a death knell to liability going forward.  
 41.  Pollard v. Ashby, 793 S.W.2d 394, 403 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990). 
 42.  Sullivan v. Aventis, Inc., No. 14-cv-2939-NSR, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
107360, at *33 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2015). 
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Depakote,44 Depo Medrol,45 Dilantin,46 Duphaston,47 Duragesic,48 
Effient,49 Elidel,50 Halcion,51 Isotretinoin,52 Levaquin,53 
MER/29,54 Ortho-Novum,55 Panalba,56 Parlodel,57 Paxil,58 
                                                                                                     
 43.  Barson ex. rel. Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 682 P.2d 832, 841 (Utah 
1984). 
 44.  Barron v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 529 S.W.3d 795, 797 (Mo. 2017) (en banc); 
see also Smalley v. Lobas, JVR No. 359699, 1998 WL 1060870 (Pa. Oct. 1, 1998). 
 45.  Proctor v. Davis, 682 N.E.2d 1203, 1215 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997). 
 46.  PATTERSON, supra note 31, cites Mooney v. Parke, Davis & Co., No. 77-
355-NPZ (Mich. Ct. Cl. Dec. 12, 1979); Alboher v. Parke-Davis, Inc., No. 80 Civ. 
0046 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 1983); and Keenan v. Parke, Davis & Co., No. 84-1667 
(R.I. Super. Ct. July 18, 1990), along with several wins for the manufacturer. 
 47.  Glass v. Philips Roxane, No. C0270-762 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 12, 1983)., 
in PATTERSON, supra note 31, at “Dydrogesterone.” 
 48.  Duragesic is a fentanyl patch. See Erony v. Alza Corp., 913 F. Supp. 
195, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (allowing a failure to warn claim). Janssen 
Pharmaceutical Products L.P. v. Hodgemire, a decision that focused mainly on 
the admissibility of plaintiff’s expert testimony, accepted a design defect claim. 
49 So. 3d 767, 769 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010). In DiCosolo v. Janssen 
Pharmaceuticals., Inc., the plaintiff brought what the court called a “nonspecific 
defect” claim and won an $18 million judgment, which was affirmed on appeal. 
951 N.E. 2d 1238, 1245 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). 
 49.  Estate of DeMoss v. Eli Lilly & Co., 234 F. Supp. 3d 873, 879–80 (W.D. 
Ky. 2017).  
 50.  Weiss v. Fujisawa Pharm. Co., 464 F. Supp. 2d 666, 669 (E.D. Ky. 
2006). 
 51.  Carlin v. Upjohn Co., 920 P.2d 1347, 1355 (Cal. 1996). 
 52.  McCarrell v. Hoffmann-La-Roche, Inc., 153 A.3d 207, 225 (N.J. 2017); 
Mason v. Hoffman-LaRoche, No. 01-2416-CA (Fla. Escambia County Ct. Oct. 11, 
2007), in PATTERSON, supra note 31 at “Isotretinoin.”  
 53.  Schedin v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharms., Inc., No. 08-5743 (JRT) (D. 
Minn. Dec. 7, 2010), in PATTERSON, supra note 31 at “Levofloxacin.” 
 54.  Successful litigation against MER/29 took place long enough ago that 
products liability diction had not yet found a home in case law. See Toole v. 
Richardson-Merrell Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 418 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) (affirming 
compensatory and punitive damages award without reference to defect). See 
generally Paul D. Rheingold, The MER/29 Story—An Instance of Successful 
Mass Disaster Litigation, 56 CAL. L. REV. 116 (1968) (providing a frontlines 
account of MER/29 litigation). 
 55.  Brochu v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 655 (1st Cir. 1981); 
McEwen v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 528 P.2d 522, 544 (Or. 1974); Wooderson v. 
Ortho Pharm. Corp., 681 P.2d  1038, 1065 (Kan. 1984).  
 56.  Miller v. Upjohn Co., 465 So. 2d 42, 47 (La. Ct. App. 1985). 
 57.  Sandoz Pharms. Corp. v. Roberts, No. 94-CA-2757-MR (Ky. Ct. App. 
Aug. 9, 1996), in PATTERSON, supra note 31, at “Bromocriptine Mesylate.” 
 58.  Estates of Tobin v. Smithkline Beecham Pharms., 164 F. Supp. 2d 
1278, 1287–90 (D. Wyo. 2001). 
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Phenergan,59 Posicor,60 Prempro,61 Thyalis,62 Topamax,63 Vioxx,64 
Xanax,65 Xarelto,66 and Yutopar.67  
Of foremost interest in this list is what is not on it. Opioids, 
for starters, are mostly though not entirely absent.68 An 
especially salient omission is the most vilified of prescription 
opioids, OxyContin.69 Its manufacturer, Purdue Pharma, has 
beaten numerous plaintiffs in decisional law.70 Vioxx, the most 
infamous brand name present on the roster,71 generated zero 
                                                                                                     
 59.  Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 581 (2009).  
 60.  Bryant v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 585 S.E.2d 723, 730 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2003). 
 61.  Fraser v. Wyeth, Inc., 992 F. Supp. 2d 68, 83 (D. Conn. 2014); 
Rivera-Adams v. Wyeth, No. 03-1713 (JAF), 2010 WL 5072541, at *3 (D.P.R. 
Dec. 8, 2010).  
 62.  United States v. Lanpar Co., 293 F. Supp. 147, 154–55 (N.D. Tex. 
1968). 
 63.  Gurley v. Janssen Pharms., Inc., 113 A.3d 283, 295 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2015). 
 64.  Humeston v. Merck & Co., No. ATL-L-2272-03-MT (N.J. Atlantic 
County Ct. Nov. 3, 2005); Garza v. Merck & Co., No. DC-03-841 (Tex. Dist. Ct. 
Apr. 21, 2006), in PATTERSON, supra note 31, at “Rofecoxib.”  
 65.  Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189, 1196 (Alaska 1992). 
 66.  In re Xarelto (Rivaroxaban) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2592, 2017 WL 
1395312, at *4 (E.D. La. Apr. 13, 2017). 
 67.  Tobin v. Astra Pharm. Prods., 993 F.2d 528, 545 (6th Cir. 1993). 
 68.  Duragesic falls in the opioid category. See Erony v. Alza Corp., 913 F. 
Supp. 195, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (noting that Duragesic is a skin patch that 
contains the opioid fentanyl). 
 69.  See Sujata S. Jayawant & Rajesh Balkrishnan, The Controversy 
Surrounding Oxycontin Abuse: Issues and Solutions, 1 THERAPEUTICS & 
CLINICAL RISK MGMT. 77, 78 (2005) (noting that OxyContin has received 
substantial attention for its “addiction liability and abuse potential”).  
 70.  See, e.g., Bodie v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 236 F. App’x 511, 521 (11th Cir. 
2007) (rejecting plaintiff’s failure to warn claim); McCauley v. Purdue Pharma 
L.P., 331 F. Supp. 2d 449, 465 (W.D. Va. 2004) (ruling against OxyContin 
plaintiffs on causation); Williams v. Purdue Pharma Co., 297 F. Supp. 2d 171, 
176 (D.D.C. 2003) (concluding that plaintiffs’ OxyContin injury was not 
cognizable). 
 71.  This painkiller generated litigation costly to its manufacturer. See Alex 
Berenson, Merck Agrees to Settle Vioxx Suits for $4.85 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
9, 2007), https://perma.cc/U8Z2-TP5U (last visited Oct. 23, 2019) (noting Merck 
agreed to pay $4.85 billion to settle 27,000 lawsuits by individuals who were 
harmed by Vioxx) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Deciding 
to withdraw this drug wiped out $26.8 billion from Merck’s market 
capitalization. See Walter T. Champion, Jr., A Tale of Two Cities: A 
Commentary on the Media’s Response to Personal Injury “Feeding Frenzies” as a 
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published judicial conclusions on what about it could be deemed 
defective; the citations above are to two unpublished decisions. 
No thalidomide on the list either. Diethystylbestrol (DES), a 
never-patented hormone, was costly to its sellers in the 1980s,72 
but to this day lacks any judicial analysis of its defectiveness or 
manufacturer negligence because courts that ruled for DES 
plaintiffs seemed to presume product defect or breach of duty 
without discussing the issue.73  
Several names that fill the list of plaintiff wins would be 
equally at home in the list of plaintiff losses. Patients who took 
some of these drugs, including but not limited to Bendectin, 
Dilantin, Duragesic, Ortho-Novum, and Paxil, brought 
personal-injury actions in court that failed.74 Delalutin later went 
on to be exonerated by later studies and thus was not defective, 
said a New Jersey court after the Barson win for plaintiffs in 
Utah.75 
The numerator is misleadingly large in other respects. The 
majority of the wins alleged warning defect, a cause of action 
increasingly vulnerable to preemption.76 Design defect wins are 
extra tiny in number. The significant and enduring design defect 
win for plaintiffs—a case to take seriously not only when it was 
                                                                                                     
Result of the Vioxx and Silicosis Litigation, 31 WHITTIER L. REV. 47, 53 (2009) 
(“As a result of Merck’s withdrawal of Vioxx, the company was forced to forgo 
any future profits from a recorded $2.5 billion in sales in 2003, and erasing 
$26.8 billion from its market capitalization.”). 
 72.  Anita Bernstein, Markets of Mothers, in TORTS STORIES 151, 165 (Robert 
L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2003). 
 73.  See id. at 157 (noting that judges typically began by presuming that 
DES manufacturers could be found liable if the identification problem were 
resolved); see also Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 343 N.W.2d 164, 176 (Mich. 1984) 
(accepting plaintiffs’ allegations as sufficient without discussing breach).   
 74.  See Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 897 F.2d 1159, 1164 (D.C. Cir. 
1990) (Bendectin loss); Eck v. Parke, Davis & Co., 256 F.3d 1013, 1024 (10th 
Cir. 2001) (Dilantin loss); Miller v. ALZA Corp., 759 F. Supp. 2d 929, 945 (S.D. 
Ohio 2010) (Duragesic loss); Lindsay v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 637 F.2d 87, 95 (2d 
Cir. 1980) (Ortho-Novum loss). Dolan v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC, 901 F.3d 803, 
816 (7th Cir. 2018) (Paxil loss). 
 75.  Zweig v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 536 A.2d 1280, 1283 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1988). 
 76.  See infra Part III.B (discussing preemption as an insulation to 
liability). Design defect claims are also vulnerable. See Mut. Pharm. Co. v. 
Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472, 493 (2013) (concluding that design defect claims are 
preempted when the drug is generic). 
(ALMOST) NO BAD DRUGS 17 
decided but going forward—is Fraser v. Wyeth, Inc.,77 in which a 
Connecticut federal court wrote a published decision accepting a 
design defect claim for Prempro, a synthetic hormone still 
marketed as a menopause treatment.78 Prempro actions came 
together in a robust multidistrict litigation in Arkansas;79 the 
successor of Wyeth announced in 2012 that it expected to pay out 
more than $1.2 billion for the harms of this product.80 But even 
this triumph for plaintiffs has a counter-record. Ample decisional 
law disagrees with Fraser and sides with the manufacturer.81 The 
billion-plus settlement expense was announced two years before a 
court approved a design-defect claim,82 suggesting that products 
liability was relatively insignificant even in drug design-defect 
liability’s greatest hit. 
Did my searches find every drug win that plaintiffs achieved 
in court? No: they are a first round of counting. That said, two 
concluding remarks about the numerator.  
First, other searches could well cause the total to drop rather 
than rise, because a drug that suffers under decisional law can 
turn its fortunes around. The manufacturer of Bendectin—a 
marginal example of a drug deemed bad, but one I decided to 
leave in—took this morning-sickness pill off the U.S. market in 
                                                                                                     
 77.  992 F. Supp. 2d 68 (D. Conn. 2014). 
 78.  See id. at 84 (declining to grant defendant-manufacturer’s motion for 
judgment as a matter of law as to plaintiffs’ design defect claim).  
 79.  See generally In re Prempro Prods. Liab. Litig., 549 F. Supp. 2d 1398 
(J.P.M.L. 2008). 
 80.  Jef Feeley, Pfizer Paid $896 Million in Prempro Settlements, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS (June 12, 2012), https://perma.cc/2JBT-AJ39 (last visited Oct. 
23, 2019) (noting that the settlement resolved only about sixty percent of the 
lawsuits filed against Prempro) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). The multidistrict litigation wrapped up in 2016. See Order, In re 
Prempro Prods., No. 03-CV-1507 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 9, 2016), ECF No. 3315 
(closing the action “since all substantive issues have been resolved”). 
 81.  See, e.g., Torkie-Tork v. Wyeth, 757 F. Supp. 2d 567, 573 (E.D. Va. 
2010) (finding for defendant-manufacturer); Tsavaris v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 
15-cv-21826, 2016 WL 375008, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 1, 2016) (granting 
defendant-manufacturer’s motion to dismiss); Bailey v. Wyeth, Inc., 37 A.3d 549, 
585 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2008) (granting defendant-manufacturer’s motion 
for summary judgment). 
 82.  Compare Feeley, supra note 80 (announcing the settlement amount in 
2012), with Fraser, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 84 (approving a design defect claim in a 
decision published in 2014).  
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1983 when claims grew profuse,83 but Bendectin regained FDA 
approval and is back under another name.84 Observers have 
applied the label of “junk science” to Bendectin plaintiffs’ 
proffered evidence about defect and causation.85 Second, because 
the list includes decisional law that merely denied summary 
disposition rather than entered judgments for plaintiffs, the wins 
list includes cases that may well have gone on to defeats. 
B. The Enormous Denominator 
Difficulties of how and what to count continue in what this 
Article calls the denominator—the population of prescription 
drugs that could have been accused in court of defectiveness. One 
way to think about the denominator is to consider the dollar size 
of this market. Estimates vary; all are high. In 2002, the 
Congressional Budget Office stated that over the next decade, 
Americans over the age of sixty-five would spend $1.8 trillion 
on prescription drugs.86 More recently, a student author observed 
that “[c]onsumer spending on pharmaceutical drugs in the United 
States is nearly $425 billion per year and is estimated to top $600 
billion by 2020.”87 Another student-authored assessment priced 
                                                                                                     
 83.  See Dennis Thompson, Doctors Divided over Report That Popular 
Morning Sickness Drug Doesn’t Work, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 18, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/Z6NX-994F (last visited Oct. 23, 2019) (reporting that the drug 
was voluntarily pulled from the market in the 1980s over concerns that it was 
linked with birth defects) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 84.  Bendectin now goes by the rather odd name of Diclegis. See Margaret F. 
Steele, FDA Allows Return of Drug for Morning Sickness, WEBMD (Apr. 9, 
2013), https://perma.cc/3N5Z-YWV4 (last visited Oct. 23, 2019) (stating that the 
revamped drug is “the only medication specifically approved to treat the 
stomach upset many women suffer from during pregnancy”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 85.  See Lucinda M. Finley, Guarding the Gate to the Courthouse: How Trial 
Judges Are Using Their Evidentiary Screening Role to Remake Tort Causation 
Rules, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 338–39 (1999) (stating that the Bendectin 
litigation was a “significant source of controversy” regarding expert opinions 
“not well-founded in scientific methodology” and “departures from the 
mainstream of scientific opinion”).  
 86.  See Chad D. Silker, America's New War on Drugs: Should the United 
States Legalize Prescription Drug Reimportation?, 31 J. LEGIS. 379, 381 (2005) 
(estimating that Americans spent $140.6 billion on outpatient prescription 
drugs in 2001 alone).  
 87.  Daniel Burke, Note, An Examination of Product Hopping by 
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American prescription drug spending at $323 billion in 2016, 
“after rebates and discounts.”88 A third of a trillion in 2017, said a 
U.S. government report.89 
A more apples-to-apples approach looks for the number of 
drugs in the denominator. The Food and Drug Administration 
publishes lists of approved drugs in a reference nicknamed the 
Orange Book.90 This text provides names, dosages, and data to 
guide substitution decisions for patients, but no count.91 I tasked 
a research assistant with the laborious work of going through the 
Orange Book to estimate its tally, excluding entries that repeated 
the name of a drug with a different dosage. While a drug 
approved at both, say, ten milligram and fifty milligram doses 
could defensibly be counted as two separate products, I counted 
each named drug only once. The total of prescription drugs 
yielded was just over 15,000.  
The real denominator is bigger, and not only because 
different numbers of milligrams do bespeak different products.92 
The FDA drops from the Orange Book drugs that lost their 
approval because of safety or efficacy concerns.93 Such drugs were 
marketed before they left the compendium. Their number, though 
not officially known or counted, is greater than zero.94 
                                                                                                     
Brand-Name Prescription Drug Manufacturers: The Problem and a Proposed 
Solution, 66 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 415, 419 (2018). 
 88.  Cami R. Schiel, Comment, Leveraging Pharma to Lower Premiums: 
Medical Loss Ratio Regulation in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 2018 BYU L. 
REV. 205, 208 (2018). 
 89.  See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., NAT’L HEALTH 
EXPENDITURES 2017 HIGHLIGHTS 1 (2017), https://perma.cc/VQ7T-TVHD (PDF) 
(stating that prescription drug spending increased 0.4 percent to $333.4 billion). 
 90.  See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH 
THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS (2019) [hereinafter Orange Book] 
(identifying drug products approved on the basis of safety and effectiveness by 
the FDA under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act).  
 91.  Id. at 3-1–3-452. 
 92.  See id. (separating different prescription drugs by milligram base).  
 93.  See id. at iv (“The main criterion for the inclusion of any product is that 
the product is the subject of an application with an approval that has not been 
withdrawn for safety or efficacy reasons.”). 
 94.  Nicholas S. Downing et al., Postmarket Safety Events Among Novel 
Therapeutics Approved by the US Food and Drug Administration Between 2001 
and 2010, 317 J. AM. MED. ASS’N, 1854, 1856 (2017). 
20 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2020) 
Thirty divided by 15,000 equals 0.002. Imprecision in both 
numerator and denominator makes me hesitate to say that 
roughly 99.8% of prescription drugs are, as far as courts that hear 
products liability claims are concerned, good enough: but this 
percentage is close to accurate. One-fifth of one percent amounts 
to almost no bad drugs and near-total products liability 
immunity. I turn now to explaining this result. 
III. Questionable Doctrinal Supports for Immunity 
Doctrinal supports for drug manufacturers examined in this 
section are two Restatements of Torts, preemption of state-law 
tort claims against manufacturers, and causation as an element 
of a products liability prima facie case. These three sources are 
hardly the only advantages for defendants in this battleground, 
but they have interesting traits in common. What makes them 
questionable is more than just the trenchant and persuasive 
criticism they have been receiving for decades,95 only some of 
which I review here. Separately and together, they reinforce the 
denial of redress while appearing relatively neutral on the 
surface. Three separate headwinds for plaintiffs and tailwinds for 
defendants have more force in combination than apart. 
A. Restatement Insulations from Liability 
American courts have at hand a uniquely American creation 
to aid their consideration of claims that litigants bring: 
Restatements.96 Though published by a private nonprofit 
organization rather than a legislature or other state actor,97 
Restatements as published by the American Law Institute (ALI) 
                                                                                                     
 95.  See, e.g., Joseph A. Page, Generic Product Risks: The Case Against 
Comment k and for Strict Tort Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 853, 864 (1983) 
(offering a now 37-year-old critique of comment k to Section 402A of the Second 
Restatement).  
 96.  See Charles E. Clark, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 42 YALE 
L.J. 643, 649–52 (1933) (examining the origin of the Restatements).  
 97.  See id. at 644 (discussing the American Law Institute’s role in drafting 
the Restatements). 
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strongly influence judge-made law. Through its Restatements, 
the ALI has installed “an unofficial form of codification.”98  
Judges who decide drug products liability actions continue to 
cite two Restatements of Torts.99 The ALI published the original 
Restatement (here the “Second”) in 1965 after committing to it in 
1964.100 The new one (the “Third” or the “Products Liability 
Restatement”) came out in 1998 following ALI approval in 
1997.101  
Section 402A of the Second Restatement, the provision on 
products liability prepared by William Prosser, is the ALI’s 
greatest hit; no other Restatement rule on any subject has been 
cited as much.102 Decades after the arrival of a newer 
Restatement, courts continue to cite this creation. Section 402A 
does not say much about prescription drugs but what it does 
contain—a disquisition by Prosser labeled comment k—has also 
won considerable approval in the form of ample and ongoing 
citation.103 This section has even entered statutory law.104 
                                                                                                     
 98.  See Arthur T. Von Mehren, Some Reflections on Codification and Case 
Law in the Twenty-first Century, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 659, 669 (1998) (noting 
that although the Restatements are only persuasive authority, they significantly 
influence the administration of justice). 
 99.  See, e.g., Burnham v. Wyeth Labs. Inc., 348 F. Supp. 3d 109, 112 (D. 
Mass. 2018) (relying on the Second Restatement of Torts in discussion of a 
design defect claim for a drug product); Freeman v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 618 
N.W.2d 827, 837–38 (Neb. 2000) (engaging with the Third Restatement in a 
consideration of drug product liability).  
 100.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (AM. LAW. INST. 1965) (stating 
that this text was approved for publication in 1963, except for an amendment of 
section 402A authorized in 1964). 
 101.  See Robert D. Klein, A Comparison of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Products Liability and the Maryland Law of Products Liability, 30 U. BALT. L. 
REV. 273, 276 (2001) (recounting that in May 1997, the membership of the 
American Law Institute approved publication of the Third Restatement).  
 102.  FRANK J. VANDALL, A HISTORY OF CIVIL LITIGATION: POLITICAL AND 
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 49 (2011); see also Andrew F. Popper, Restatement 
Third Goes to Court, 35 TRIAL 54, 56 n.13 (1999) (stating that according to 
records maintained by the ALI, § 402A has been cited more times than any 
other Restatement section). 
 103.  See, e.g., In re DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., Pinnacle Hip Implant Prod. 
Liab. Litig., 888 F.3d 753, 772 (5th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he Texas Supreme Court has 
incorporated § 402A into its common law . . . and has considered comment k in 
the prescription-drug context.” (internal citation omitted)); Smith v. Howmedica 
Osteonics Corp., 251 F. Supp. 3d 844, 848 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (discussing at length 
the applicability of comment k to the facts of the case); In re Testosterone 
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The other Restatement has different and complementary 
virtues. Prosser wrote Section 402A almost on a blank slate: 
“virtually no case authority and relatively little scholarship” 
underlaid his announcement of strict liability for this category of 
injury.105 When the Third Restatement came out, products 
liability was a well-established subfield of torts.106 From the 
start, the Products Liability Restatement could include extensive 
case citations in its Reporter’s Notes. Although James Henderson 
and Aaron Twerski drafted some of their Restatement to codify 
the doctrinal outcomes they favored rather than those that courts 
had manifested in decisional law,107 their blackletter rests much 
more on precedent than did its predecessor. It is also much fuller. 
Prescription drugs fall into the margin of Section 402A—just one 
comment among many—but occupy all of Section 6 in the Third 
Restatement.108 
Judges and lawyers working in prescription drug liability 
appear well provisioned on the Restatement front, in short. 
Section 402A gives them famous, influential, and extraordinarily 
durable blackletter with a discussion of prescription drugs 
appended. Section 6 of the Third Restatement gives them 
specialist expertise in products liability and a base in modern 
cases. Neither Restatement’s treatment of prescription drugs 
provides effective support for near-total products liability 
immunity, however.  
                                                                                                     
Replacement Therapy Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 14 C 1748MDL No. 2545, 2017 
WL 1836435, at *19 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 2017) (confirming that California, 
Tennessee, and Oregon “appear to have adopted” comment k). 
 104.  See OR. REV. STAT. § 30.920 (2017) (codifying the substance of section 
402A of the Second Restatement); see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-30 (2012) 
(codifying section 402A).  
 105.  David A. Logan, When the Restatement Is Not a Restatement: The 
Curious Case of the “Flagrant Trespasser”, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1448, 1457 
(2011). 
 106.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY intro. (AM. 
LAW. INST. 1998) (acknowledging that when drafting the Third Restatement, the 
“Institute had before it thousands of judicial decisions that had fine-tuned the 
law of products liability in a manner hardly imaginable when Restatement 
Second was written”).  
 107.  OWEN, supra note 20, at 255–56. 
 108.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (AM. LAW. INST. 1965); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6 (AM. LAW. INST. 1998).  
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1. The Original Restatement 
Liability provisioned in § 402A “extends to any product sold 
in the condition, or substantially the same condition, in which it 
is expected to reach the ultimate user or consumer.”109 Some 
examples: “an automobile, a tire, an airplane, a grinding wheel, a 
water heater, a gas stove, a power tool, a riveting machine, a 
chair, and an insecticide.”110 What about a prescription drug? 
Here the acclaimed text becomes—and remains—coy.  
Prescription drugs as an object of regulation through liability 
turn up only in one of the comments to Section 402A, and the 
category is not labeled clearly. “Unavoidably unsafe products,” 
begins comment k: “There are some products which, in the 
present state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being 
made safe for their intended and ordinary use. These are 
especially common in the field of drugs.”111 Comment k then 
names as its example of this category the rabies vaccine 
developed in 1885 by the great French microbiologist Louis 
Pasteur: “Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by 
proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it 
unreasonably dangerous.”112  And then come the only explicit 
references to prescription drugs in the Second Restatement: “The 
same is true of many other drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of 
which for this very reason cannot legally be sold except to 
physicians, or under the prescription of a physician.”113  
The products liability scholars who worked to supersede this 
provision have written that “Comment k to § 402A of the 
Restatement, Second, of Torts has caused confusion in 
prescription drug litigation, seemingly without end. Bidding 
farewell to Comment k is both justifiable and overdue.”114 Hard to 
disagree, starting with the caption of “unavoidably unsafe 
products.” If we grant that the category exists, how do we know 
whether a particular product should be classified there? Prosser’s 
                                                                                                     
 109.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. LAW. INST. 1965).   
 110.  Id. cmt. d. 
 111.  Id. cmt. k. 
 112.  Id.  
 113.  Id.  
 114.  James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Drug Design Liability: 
Farewell to Comment k, 67 BAYLOR L. REV. 521, 522 (2015). 
24 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2020) 
poorly bounded diction—phrasing like “many other drugs, 
vaccines, and the like” and “many of which”—invites courts to 
regard prescription drugs as unavoidably unsafe but also permits 
them to reach a contrary conclusion. Paralleling the awkward 
drafting of Section 402A blackletter, which condemns “any 
product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous,” 
comment k says an unavoidably unsafe product “is not defective, 
nor is it unreasonably dangerous.” What does this disjunctive 
mean? Is there a difference between being defective and being 
unreasonably dangerous? The text does not say.115 
To the writers of the rival younger Restatement, the central 
wrongness of comment k lies in its misdescription of everything 
in products liability, not just the subset ostensibly identified in 
the exception it asserts. Comment k begins with “Unavoidably 
unsafe products” as its banner and then says a fraction of 
products fall into under this rubric.116 Actually all of them do, 
Henderson and Twerski argue: “All products carry with them 
categorical risks of injury that cannot be eliminated by re-design 
without destroying the product's utility.”117 In other words, “not 
just some products”—the category that comment k purports to 
talk about—“but all products, are categorically dangerous.”118  
                                                                                                     
 115.  In an article-length critique of comment k that goes beyond prescription 
drugs, still salient despite its advanced age, Joseph Page explains some of the 
incoherence of this comment with reference to drafting history inside the ALI. 
See Page, supra note 95, at 864 (suggesting that the genesis of comment k may 
help explain its blurred distinctions and “other mysteries”). Disagreement about 
whether to exempt prescription drugs from § 402A liability divided participants. 
Id. at 865–66. Members of the ALI introduced motions to write exemptions into 
the blackletter and the comments, all of which failed to pass. Id. Prosser drafted 
comment k after these proceedings, but what he wrote was neither a 
compromise between two positions nor a clarification of the debate. Id. at  
864 – 68. James Henderson and Aaron Twerski, who jettisoned this provision, 
speculate that Prosser found the gray-zone status of a comment, neither a stark 
rule nor an exclusion, politically expedient when he worked to get his bold 
Restatement approved. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 114, at 529 n.30 
(“Restatement Reporters have, on occasion, agreed to address an issue in a 
[c]omment in order to bolster political support among the ALI membership for 
more salient positions in the black letter.”). 
 116.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (AM. LAW. INST. 
1965) (“There are some products which, in the present state of human 
knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and 
ordinary use.”).   
 117.  Henderson & Twerski, supra note 114, at 526. 
 118.  Id. at 527. 
(ALMOST) NO BAD DRUGS 25 
From there new layers of errors follow. Prosser captioned his 
comment “unavoidably unsafe products” rather than “prescription 
drugs.” This diction choice made an open question about whether 
prescription drugs—some of them? all? most?—fall under the 
comment k nonliability rule with respect to design defect. The 
best-known judicial decision on this issue, issued by the 
California Supreme Court in 1988, concluded that all prescription 
drugs qualify as unavoidably unsafe products and thus are 
exempt from design defect liability.119 But comment k does not 
say so explicitly, and other courts disagree.120 
The trouble with comment k does not stop with the lack of 
clarity in it that rises to the level of incoherence. Restatements do 
not themselves change decisional law. Like a bad law review 
article or an unsound assertion in a treatise, problematic drafting 
in these works starts out as harmless error, so to speak. The 
living, ongoing, vital trouble with comment k is that judges still 
like what it has to say about liability for defective prescription 
drugs. Multiple decades after its publication—and also two 
decades after the ALI supplanted it with new Restatement 
blackletter—they cite it as authority. This implicit tribute is an 
honor for secondary writing deep in its middle age, but it 
confounds judges and lawyers who need answers.  
2. The Newer Restatement 
In contrast to the elusive, hard-to-parse comment k of the 
Second Restatement, Section 6 of the Third Restatement offers a 
full and cogent treatment of prescription drug liability. It has five 
subsections. The first announces that defective products of this 
                                                                                                     
 119.  See Brown v. Super. Ct., 751 P.2d 470, 482–83 (Cal. 1988) (concluding 
that “a manufacturer is not strictly liable for injuries caused by a prescription 
drug so long as the drug was properly prepared and accompanied by warnings of 
its dangerous propensities that were either known or reasonably scientifically 
knowable at the time of distribution”). 
 120.  See, e.g., Moss v. Wyeth Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 162, 174 (D. Conn. 2012) 
(deciding that the comment k exemption “applies on a case-by-case basis”); 
Bryant v. Hoffmann-La Roche, 585 S.E. 2d 723, 726 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (“[T]he 
Brown decision reflects the minority view among those jurisdictions to have 
considered the language of [c]omment k.”); Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189, 
1193 (Alaska 1992) (declining to adopt Brown); Toner v. Lederle Labs, 732 P.2d 
297, 308 (Idaho 1987) (refusing to find that comment k applies to all drugs). 
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category give rise to liability.121 The second reiterates the 
tripartite conception of defect that pervades this Restatement: 
manufacturing defect, defective design, and inadequate 
instructions or warnings.122 The third, Section 6(c), offers a novel 
standard for design defect: A prescription drug is defectively 
designed only if “reasonable health-care providers, knowing of 
such foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits, would not 
prescribe the drug or medical device for any class of patients.”123 
The fourth covers warning,124 and the fifth subsection discusses 
retailers as sellers.125 All blackletter in this section is clear. 
The trouble with the Third Restatement lies in its “any class 
of patients” subsection, which has gained by far the most 
scholarly attention of the five.126 While a prominent drug scholar 
gives it high praise, contending that if this rule has a 
shortcoming it is its insufficient attention to the interests of 
manufacturers,127 most of this literature has expressed 
disagreement.128 One scholar-critic calls its bottom line “overly 
protective of manufacturers.”129 
                                                                                                     
 121.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(a) (AM. 
LAW. INST. 1998) (“A manufacturer of a prescription drug or medical device who 
sells or otherwise distributes a defective drug or medical device is subject to 
liability for harm to persons caused by the defect.”). 
 122.  Id. § 6(b). 
 123.  Id. § 6(c). On this literature, see OWEN, supra note 20, at 548–60 
(gathering numerous citations from law reviews). 
 124.  Id. § 6(d). 
 125.  Id. § 6(e). 
 126.  See George W. Conk, Is There a Design Defect in the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability?, 109 YALE L.J. 1087, 1104 (2000) (“Academic 
commentators criticized the ALI's proposed rule for drugs as setting a 
‘super-negligence’ standard of liability.”); Dustin R. Marlowe, Note, A Dose of 
Reality for Section 6(c) of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 39 
GA. L. REV. 1445, 1446 (2005) (noting that the provision has received an 
“onslaught of criticism that questioned the provision's soundness and legitimacy 
in various law reviews and journals”).  
 127.  See Lars D. Noah, This Is Your Products Liability Restatement on 
Drugs, 74 BROOKLYN L. REV. 839, 848 (2009) (phrasing this point as “incomplete 
protection against inappropriate claims of defective design”). 
 128.  See, e.g., Conk, supra note 126, at 1118 (discussing the shortcomings of 
a special liability regime for medical products); George W. Conk, The True Test: 
Alternative Safer Designs for Drugs and Medical Devices in a 
Patent-Constrained Market, 49 UCLA L. REV. 737, 737 (2002) (opining that the 
new Restatement’s broader construction of design defect is inadequate); Richard 
L. Cupp, Jr., Rethinking Conscious Design Liability for Prescription Drugs: The 
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Henderson and Twerski started their Restatement work 
favoring complete and explicit immunity on design defect for this 
product.130 They were going to recognize the other two types of 
defect for prescription drugs—manufacturing and warning—but 
deny judicial redress for design claims.131 They softened their 
stance in the rule they eventually composed.132 Section 6(c) of the 
Third Restatement makes it very difficult—though not quite 
impossible—for a plaintiff to bring this type of claim. 
In contrast to what one finds in the law journals, 
judge-written writings on Section 6(c) cannot be called a rich 
literature. Courts had time before the 1998 issuance of the Third 
Restatement to absorb the teaching of this rule: in a 
pre-publication period, drafts of the entire Restatement 
circulated among the bench and bar.133 Judges have not accepted 
Section 6(c) and they have not engaged with it much.134 Here I 
review the record of thirty-two decisions.135  
                                                                                                     
Restatement (Third) Approach Versus a Negligence Approach, 63 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 76, 80 (1994) (criticizing an early version of the Restatement's approach); 
Michael D. Green, Prescription Drugs, Alternative Designs, and the Restatement 
(Third): Preliminary Reflections, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 207, 207 (1999) (calling 
the § 6(c) standard “idiosyncratic” and arguing for more attention to § 6(d), on 
warnings); Marlowe, supra note 126, at 1446 (suggesting that the belief that the 
new standard would promote uniformity in the law has yet to come to fruition). 
 129.  Cupp, supra note 128, at 80. 
 130.  See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision 
of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512, 
1543 (1992) (noting that comment k exempts all prescription drugs from design 
claims). 
 131.  See id. at 1536 (stating that their “first alternative version of comment 
k reflects a disposition to exclude judicial inquiry”). 
 132.  See id. at 1514 (allowing for manufacturer liability for design defect 
under certain conditions).  
 133.  See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, The Politics of the 
Products Liability Restatement, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 667, 668 n.2 (1998) 
(describing years of discussion among sixty members “drawn from the bench, 
bar, and academia”).  
 134.  See Marlowe, supra note 126, at 1467 (opining that courts have failed to 
thoroughly consider or adopt Section 6(c)).  
 135.  This record reached me first via a data set of thirty decisions curated by 
Aaron D. Twerski, current as of December 2017. Two new cases joined the list 
following Westlaw searches in September 2019. I thank Elaina Mansley for her 
assistance in the task of updating. Eight decisions are designated as 
unpublished; continuing to cast my net wide, see supra Part II.A., for the sake of 
including all available judge-written treatments of Section 6(c) in case law, I 
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Only one constituent of decisional law contains full-throated 
enthusiasm for Section 6(c).136 In it the presiding judge of the 
Georgia Court of Appeals advocates for acceptance of Section 6(c); 
contrasts its rule favorably to its Second Restatement 
predecessor, comment k; quotes Drug Designs are Different,137 the 
extended Henderson and Twerski defense of their rule, at some 
length; and justifies the choice of the Third Restatement to use 
risk-utility balancing as the test for design defect for most 
products while providing a separate rule for prescription drugs.138 
Judge Andrews did everything that careful and hard-working 
Reporters could want done with their blackletter, in short. But 
the Andrews opinion in Bryant is a concurrence; its embrace of 
Section 6(c) does not speak for the court. 
Next most supportive of the design-defect test provisioned by 
Section 6(c) in the data set are decisions that say nothing bad 
about it. Courts write that their state has accepted the larger 
Third Restatement and so they are willing to go along with 
Section 6(c).139 Arizona is prominent here. Five judicial decisions 
say that Arizona accepts the Restatement, good enough;140 one 
                                                                                                     
include them. 
 136.  See Bryant v. Hoffmann-La Roche, 585 S.E. 2d 723, 731–34 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2003) (Andrews, J., concurring) (discussing § 6(c) at length and urging its 
adoption as the test for prescription drug design defects). 
 137.  Henderson & Twerski, supra note 114. 
 138.  See Bryant, 585 S.E.2d at 734 (“The test for prescription drug design 
defects set forth in . . . § 6(c) establishes a better reasoned alternative to the 
design defect test adopted by the majority . . . .”). 
 139.  See, e.g., Madsen v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 477 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1037 
(E.D. Mo. 2007) (acknowledging that Missouri has adopted the Third 
Restatement). 
 140.  See D’Agnese v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 952 F. Supp. 2d 880, 889 n.7 
(D. Ariz. 2013) (quoting the Restatement (Third) of Torts); Gebhardt v. Mentor 
Corp., 191 F.R.D. 180, 185 (D. Ariz. 1999) (“[A]lthough no Arizona case has 
formally adopted the Restatement (Third) of Torts, Arizona has demonstrated a 
willingness to look to the Restatement (Third) as the current statement of the 
law.” (internal citation omitted)); Staub v. Breg, Inc., No. CV 10-02038, 2012 WL 
1078335, at *4 (D. Ariz. Mar. 30, 2012) (quoting the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts); Placencia v. I-Flow Corp., No. CV 10-2520, 2012 WL 5877624, at *3 (D. 
Ariz. Nov. 20, 2012) (“Courts in this District apply the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts to medical device design defect claims.” (internal citation omitted)); Mills 
v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., No. CV 11-00968, 2011 WL 4708850, at *2 (D. Ariz. 
Oct. 7, 2011) (“Although plaintiff’s design defect claim is pled pursuant to 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402(a), this no longer appears to be the correct 
standard . . . .”).  
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expresses skepticism about Section 6.141 One approval of Section 
6(c) in a footnote talks only about the learned intermediary 
doctrine, not defective design.142 An Iowa Supreme Court 
concurrence-and-dissent cites Section 6(c) with approval, but only 
to say that this blackletter establishes a “duty of care to balance 
risks and benefits of prescription drugs with respect to design.”143 
Risk-utility balancing was what the Reporters wrote Section 6(c) 
to reject, not to impose. A New York federal trial court mentions 
Section 6(c) by-the-bye as an example of federally-regulated 
products in tort litigation.144 An Iowa federal trial court observes 
that both the plaintiff and the defendant cited Section 6(c) when 
disagreeing about an affirmative defense, but the decision does 
not engage with the substance of this blackletter.145 This cluster 
of case law expresses no approval of the Reporters’ choice on 
design defect, and the content of Section 6(c) has no effect on the 
results.146  
The last group of cases expresses mild hostility toward 
Section 6(c). In Tersingi v. Wyeth,147 the First Circuit refused to 
apply Section 6(c) but did so in response to an eccentric reading of 
it as supposedly more pro-plaintiff than the risk-utility test.148 In 
an unpublished federal decision, defendants urged the trial court 
                                                                                                     
 141.  See Harrison v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp., No. CIV 06-0745, 2008 WL 
615886, at *1–2 (D. Ariz. Mar. 3, 2008) (requiring supplemental briefing on the 
applicability of Section 6(c)). 
 142.  Rimbert v. Eli Lilly & Co., 577 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1223 n.6 (D.N.M. 
2008). 
 143.  Huck v. Wyeth, Inc. 850 N.W.2d 353, 394 (Iowa 2014) (Hecht, J., 
concurring and dissenting). 
 144.  See In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., 438 
F. Supp. 2d 291, 300–01 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (ruling that federal regulation will not 
preclude a products liability action). 
 145.  See Nicholson v. Biomet, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 3d 931, 937 (N.D. Iowa 
2019) (limiting discussion of Section 6(c) to the parties’ briefs on the issue). 
Nicholson, an action complaining about an artificial hip joint, mentions 
prescription drugs nowhere. Id. at 935. 
 146.  See, e.g., Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 394; Adams, 576 So. 2d at 732; In re 
MBTE Prods. Liab. Litig., 438 F. Supp. 2d at 300–01; Nicholson, 363 F. Supp. 3d 
at 937. 
 147.  817 F.3d 364 (1st Cir. 2016). 
 148.  See id. at 369 (“Tersigni asks us to assume . . . that Massachusetts 
courts would recognize his negligent design claim, . . . and those same courts 
would grant a heretofore unrecognized exception to the general requirement of 
proof of a reasonable alternative design.”). 
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to embrace Section 6(c), in response to which the court wrote that 
“the standard set forth in § 402A, as interpreted in recent 
Colorado Supreme Court cases, remains the governing standard 
as to a design defect theory.”149 In another unpublished federal 
court decision—this one from Texas—defendants also pointed to 
Section 6(c) to support their position, but the court would not 
accept it because its own “research had failed to unearth any 
Texas or Fifth Circuit authority applying the standard 
articulated in § 6(c) in the context of a design defect claim.”150 A 
couple of years later, a West Virginia federal court said the same 
thing: Texas law does not accept Section 6(c).151 Going further, a 
Florida federal court refused to apply Section 6(c) while 
acknowledging that Florida had accepted the Restatement test 
for design defect for other products.152 
A few courts have expressed open antipathy to the design 
defect test of Section 6(c). The Southern District of New York,  
refusing to apply its “any class of patients” test,153 along the way 
called the Restatement “a treatise” in a tone that did not sound 
complimentary: “As a federal court sitting in diversity, the Court 
is hesitant to stitch into decades of Florida tort law one section of 
a treatise that its courts have shown no apparent interest in 
adopting over the past twelve years.”154  
                                                                                                     
 149.  Lynch v. Olympus America, No. 18-cv-00512, 2018 WL 5619327, at *9 
n.7 (D. Colo. Oct. 20, 2018). Like Nicholson, Lynch is a medical device case. Id. 
at *1–2. 
 150.  Lea v. Wyeth LLC, No. 1:03-CV-1339, 2011 WL 13192701, at *12 (E.D. 
Tex. Oct. 28, 2011). 
 151.  See In re Ethicon, Inc. Pelvic Repair, Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 
2:12-cv-4301, 2014 WL 186869, at *6 (S.D. W. Va. Jan. 15, 2014) (rejecting 
Ethicon’s contention that because several Texas cases rely on the Restatement 
(Third) regarding general products liability claims, Section 6(c) should be 
applied). 
 152.  See Tillman v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 3d 1307, 1345 (M.D. Fla. 
2015) (“[R]egardless of whether the Third Restatement applies under Florida 
law in other contexts, in a medical device case such as this, Florida law does not 
apply this [i.e. Section 6(c)’s] standard.”). 
 153.  See In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., 742 F. Supp. 2d 460, 471 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (specifying that the “any class of patients” test is met when the 
“foreseeable risks of harm posed by the drug are so high in comparison to the 
benefits that reasonable health-care providers, knowing of such foreseeable 
risks . . . would not prescribe the drug . . . for any class of patients”).  
 154.  Id. at 472. 
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The best-known reception of Section 6(c) in the courts is 
blunt speech from the Nebraska Supreme Court: “We conclude 
that § 6(c) has no basis in the case law. We view § 6(c) as too 
strict of a rule, under which recovery would be nearly impossible. 
Accordingly, we do not adopt § 6(c) of the Third Restatement.”155 
The opinion for the court in Bryant, mentioned above to note a 
concurrence that contains the most pro-Section 6(c) 
judicially-authored language in the United States,156 agreed with 
this bottom line, summarizing the Nebraska condemnation: 
In particular, § 6(c) has been criticized for its failure to reflect 
existing case law, its lack of flexibility with regard to drugs 
involving differing benefits and risks, its unprecedented 
application of a reasonable physician standard, and the fact 
that a consumer’s claim could easily be defeated by expert 
opinion that the drug had some use for someone, despite 
potentially harmful effects on a large class of individuals.157 
This negative reception should itself be received with 
caution. Judicial aversion to Section 6(c) does not mean that 
Section 6(c) gets design-defect law wrong.158 Authors of opinions 
citing this blackletter do not know as much about products 
liability as the Reporters of the Restatement.  
Shakiness here, in my view, is not substantive error within 
the Restatement but rather its lack of guidance for courts. 
Decisions about liability ought ideally to align with blackletter 
that judges and litigators consume to inform their work. No such 
guidance is present in doctrinal material that is still academic, so 
to speak, after having had more than twenty years to win judicial 
followers. 
In sum, both the original treatment of products liability in 
the Restatement of Torts and its 1998 successor have in different 
                                                                                                     
 155.  Freeman v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 618 N.W.2d 827, 840 (Neb. 2000). 
 156.  See supra notes 136 and 138 and accompanying text (discussing the 
Andrews concurrence praising Section 6(c)). 
 157.  Bryant v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 585 S.E.2d 723, 727 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2003) (citing Freeman, 618 N.W.2d at 840). 
 158.  See Richard L. Cupp Jr., Preemption’s Rise (and Bit of a Fall) as 
Products Liability Reform: Wyeth, Rigel, Altria, and the Restatement (Third)’s 
Prescription Product Design Defect Standard, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 727, 755–58 
(2009) (arguing that just because courts have not looked fondly upon Section 6(c) 
does not mean the provision does not accurately capture courts’ “general pulse” 
on design defect).  
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ways proved unsatisfactory as sources of guidance to courts. The 
Second Restatement’s contribution to drug law is incoherent and 
has sowed confusion in American courts; the Third Restatement 
has failed to convince judges of its correctness. By including 
pharma-favoring doctrines, the Restatements have, however, 
helped to underscore a message that one particular product ought 
to be spared the hardships of products liability. This work has 
been functional enough to enlarge immunity. 
B. Preemption as Insulation from Liability 
American drug regulation has to live with a risk that 
oversight or even deceit by manufacturers will cause the agency 
in charge, the Food and Drug Administration, to approve or 
condone the sale of dangerous products.159 Any regulatory design 
that depends on candor, accuracy, and diligence from the 
regulated sector needs safeguards against omissions and 
misstatement. Liability has traditionally been one such 
safeguard, but preemption impedes this opportunity to make 
prescription drugs safer.160  
When accepted as an affirmative defense in court, 
preemption decrees that a drug-defect plaintiff will receive no 
relief, no matter how defective or dangerous the pharmaceutical 
product may be.161 Obliteration of what would otherwise be a 
good legal claim is powerful medicine, and so one would think it 
needs a good reason to exist. At least in principle, state (tort) and 
federal (regulatory) law bring separate strengths to the task of 
                                                                                                     
 159.  See Mary J. Davis, Time for a Fresh Look at Strict Liability for 
Pharmaceuticals, 28 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 399, 436–37 (2019) (noting 
pressure from the pharmaceutical industry on the FDA).  
 160.  See id. at 422 (“Federal preemption of state product[s] liability laws has 
dramatically limited the ability of consumers injured by pharmaceuticals to 
recover for those injuries . . . .”); see also David G. Owen, Federal Preemption of 
Products Liability Claims, 55 S.C. L. REV. 411, 413 (2003) (“[A]ny state law that 
in fact interferes with the operation of a federal statue or regulation thereunder 
contravenes the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.”). 
 161.  See Hawkins v. Leslie’s Pool Mart, Inc., 184 F.3d 244, 256 (3d Cir. 
1999) (recognizing preemption as an affirmative defense); see also Owen, supra 
note 160, at 413 (discussing the effect of preemption in pharmaceutical products 
liability cases).  
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protecting health and safety.162 And again in principle, a 
presumption against preemption holds up the state-law half of 
this partnership.163 
The United States Supreme Court has issued several 
decisions on preemption of personal injury claims against 
prescription drug manufacturers.164 The first of them ruled in 
favor of an injured plaintiff, holding that the Federal Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act did not preempt a state-law failure to warn 
claim.165 Because FDA regulations expressly permit 
manufacturers to alter an agency-approved drug warning 
unilaterally to reflect newly acquired information about risks and 
safety, the Court concluded that “impossibility preemption”—the 
kind of preemption that blocks a personal injury claim because 
the defendant could not have given the warning the plaintiff 
wanted while complying with what the FDA ordered at the same 
time166—did not bar a patient from seeking tort redress in the 
Vermont courts.167 And so it appeared in 2009 that preemption 
doctrine has room for judicial redress of the injuries that 
prescription drugs cause. 
Two other Supreme Court drug-preemption decisions, 
however, soon went on to block this opportunity. PLIVA, Inc. v. 
Messing168 held in 2011 that failure-to-warn claims are 
                                                                                                     
 162.  See Amalea Smirniotopoulos, Bad Medicine: Prescription Drugs, 
Preemption, and the Potential for a No-fault Fix, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 797, 797–98 (2011) (describing the relationship as “symbiotic”). 
 163.  Like the separate-strengths premise, the presumption against 
preemption is honored in the breach. See Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the 
Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. L. REV. 967, 968, 1028 (2002) 
(attributing the “supposed presumption against preemption of state regulation” 
to the states’ traditional police powers). 
 164.  See, e.g., Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472, 487 (2013); PLIVA, 
Inc. v. Messing, 564 U.S. 604, 626 (2011); Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 581 
(2009). 
 165. See Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 581 (concluding that the plaintiff’s claim did not 
“obstruct the federal regulation of drug labeling”). 
 166.  See Michael M. Gallagher, Clear Evidence of Impossibility Preemption 
After Wyeth v. Levine, 51 GONZ. L. REV. 439, 476 (2016) (explaining that to 
succeed on an impossibility preemption, a drug company must demonstrate that 
complying with both federal and state regulation cannot be done). 
 167.  See Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 573 (“Wyeth has failed to demonstrate that it 
was impossible for it to comply with both federal and state requirements.”). 
 168.  564 U.S. 604 (2011). 
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preempted when the injurious drug is generic rather than 
brand-name,169 and Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett,170 
decided two years later, concluded that design-defect claims 
against generic-drug manufacturers are also preempted.171 
Eighty percent of drug prescriptions are for generics.172 The 
pro-plaintiff holding in Wyeth, addressing the brand-name drug 
Phenergan, landed on a manufacturer in the minority.173 
Lower courts continue this work of redress-blocking in their 
holdings on state-law fraud-on-the-FDA claims, where an injured 
consumer seeks to show that informed expertise did not guide 
approval of the defendant’s drug.174 Misstatements or material 
omissions made initially in a new-drug application, or later on in 
reports about adverse experiences, could steer the agency from 
the disapproval or prohibition that it would have chosen absent 
this intentional conduct by a manufacturer.175 The reason for 
preemption is deference to agency competence, not judicial 
support for dishonesty.176 And yet federal circuit courts, instead 
of uniting around preemption’s central value and rejecting 
extensions of the doctrine that abet deceit, are split on 
                                                                                                     
 169.  See id. at 613, 626 (“[B]rand-name and generic drug manufacturers 
have different federal drug labeling duties.”). 
 170.  570 U.S. 472 (2013). 
 171.  See id. at 487, 493.  
 172.  Robert C. Baker III, Requiem for a Remedy: The Law and Economics of 
Mutual Pharmaceutical v. Bartlett’s Over-Preemption, 74 MD. L. REV. ENDNOTES 
81, 81–82 (2015). 
 173.  See id. at 106 (explaining that even the FDA took notice of the 
“arbitrary disparity” resulting from Wyeth and PLIVA). 
 174.  See, e.g., Lofton v. McNeil Consumer & Specialty Pharm., 672 F.3d 372, 
379 (5th Cir. 2012) (affirming summary judgment where plaintiff’s theory of 
fraud rested solely on the FDA disclosure requirements).  
 175.   For a different judicial concern on point, see Jennifer A. Surprenant, 
Note, Should Preemption Apply in a Pharmaceutical Context? An Analysis of the 
Preemption Debate and What Regulatory Compliance Statutes Contribute to the 
Discussion, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 327, 359 n.250 (2008) (noting the Supreme 
Court in Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee, 531 U.S. 341 (2001), was 
concerned that requiring too much disclosure would burden the FDA in 
subsequent approvals). In Buckman, the plaintiffs complained of injuries 
resulting from the use of orthopedic bone screws. Buckman, 531 U.S. at 343. The 
Court concluded that state law fraud-on-the-FDA claims “inevitably conflict 
with the FDA’s responsibility to police fraud consistently with the 
Administration’s judgment and objectives.” Id. at 350.  
 176.  Baker, supra note 172, at 89.  
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preemption of state-law fraud-on-the-FDA claims.177 Cases 
finding preemption of prescription drug claims extend a 2001 
Supreme Court decision about fraud-on-the-FDA claims with 
respect to medical devices.178 Medical device claims are expressly 
preempted, however, and drug claims are not.179  
If skeptics on the federal bench fear that plaintiffs’ lawyers 
will fling fraud accusations at defendants without care or 
justification, preemption by judicial inference (rather than by the 
express version of preemption) is not the solution to this problem. 
Twenty-first century federal pleading rules discourage litigation 
abuse of this stripe.180 If these safeguards are for any reason 
insufficient, robust sanctions of attorney (and client) misconduct 
add more deterrence.181 Applying preemption to block claims of 
fraud on the only agency with enough expertise to deliver safety 
and effectiveness in prescription drugs harms a carefully formed 
regulatory design and increases the risk of injury to persons who 
depend on these products.182 
The preemption trendline has moved in only one direction 
since the early years of the century that brought Wyeth v. Levine. 
In 2002, the FDA for the first time in its hundred-year history 
                                                                                                     
 177.  Compare Garcia v. Wyeth Ayerst Labs., 385 F.3d 961, 966 (6th Cir. 
2004) (preempted), and Lofton v. McNeil Consumer & Specialty Pharm., 672 
F.3d 372, 380 (5th Cir. 2012) (same), with Desiano v. Warner-Lambert & Co., 
467 F.3d 85, 97 (2d Cir. 2006) (not preempted); see also Christine A. Gaddis, 
Buckman Extended: Federal Preemption of State Fraud on the FDA Statutes, 69 
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 113, 125–35 (2014) (evaluating the circuit split). 
 178.  See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 348 (2001) 
(holding plaintiffs’ state-law fraud-on-the-FDA claims conflicted with federal 
law and were thus “impliedly pre-empted”).  
 179.  See Gaddis, supra note 177, at 116 (“The M[edical] D[evice] 
A[mendments] include[] an express preemption provision relating to medical 
devices.”).  
 180.  See Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play 
on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 12 (2010) (commenting 
on the end of “notice pleading,” which permits plaintiffs to assert claims 
relatively easily, and the rise of summary judgment for defendants). 
 181.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (establishing sanctions in litigation); MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (provisioning a 
disciplinary rule on “meritorious claims and contentions”). 
 182.  Cf. Catherine M. Sharkey, Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing: The 
FDA’s Dual Role as Safety and Health Information Regulator, 68 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 343, 344–45 (2019) (recognizing that the regulatory design and oversight 
allows the FDA to both promote health and safety and create innovative policy).  
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announced that its prescription drug regulations preempt 
personal injury claims.183 Before 2002, the agency had taken the 
position that liability and regulation provide complementary, 
rather than conflicting, sources of consumer protection.184 As for 
Wyeth, in 2019 the Supreme Court narrowed its generosity to 
plaintiffs with a follow-up decision that enlarged impossibility 
preemption.185 
The FDA’s ability to keep defectively-designed drugs from 
the market—and, going beyond design, to protect the consuming 
public from preventable harms caused by prescription  
drugs — depends on conditions that are separate from its good 
faith and regulatory competence. The agency needs adequate 
funding, independence from the sector it regulates, and the power 
to write meaningful standards that support its 
safety-and-effectiveness statutory mandate.186 Preemption 
notwithstanding, it needs the complimentary function of tort 
                                                                                                     
 183.  See Mary J. Davis, The Battle over Implied Preemption: Products 
Liability and the FDA, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1089, 1090–91 (2007) (explaining that 
state common law typically does not “treat federally approved prescription drug 
labeling as conclusive on the question of the label’s adequacy”). 
 184.  See id. at 1094–95 (“Before 2002, the FDA maintained the position that 
its product approval process and state tort liability usually operate 
independently—each providing a significant, yet distinct, layer of consumer 
protection.”).  
 185.  See Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668, 1679 
(2019) (concluding that so long as the FDA is acting within the scope of its 
congressionally delegated authority, FDA labeling standards preempt state 
law). This outcome was anticipated. See Ian Millhiser, Supreme Court Considers 
Whether Drug Companies Can Poison Patients and Get Away with It, 
THINKPROGRESS (Jan. 4, 2019, 9:25 AM), http://perma.cc/P6ZY-L3T3 (last visited 
Oct. 11, 2019) (“There is a very good chance that it was actually impossible for 
Merck to comply with both federal and state law.”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review).  
 186.  See Alison R. McCabe, A Precarious Balancing Act—The Role of the 
FDA as Protector of Public Health and Industry Wealth, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 
787, 814 (2003) (“A lack of adequate funding to support the FDA’s various 
functions and its specialized staff frustrates the agency’s achievement of this 
balance.”); see also Marc A. Rodwin, Compensating Pharmaceutical Injuries in 
the Absence of Fault, 69 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 447, 459 n.54 (2014) (suggesting that 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Buckman was largely attributed to protecting 
the FDA’s independence); Ariele Lessing, A Supplemental Labeling Regime for 
Organic Products: How the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act Hampers a Market 
Solution to an Organic Transparency Problem, 18 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 
415, 464 (2011) (emphasizing the need for manageable standards in 
supplemental label regulation).   
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liability to deliver what agency competence cannot supply on its 
own.187 The trajectory of these necessary accompaniments is in 
decline. 
C. Causation Doctrine as a Barrier to Redress 
Pharmaceutical products illustrate how causation as an 
element of the products liability prima facie case advantages 
defendants and disadvantages plaintiffs. A consumer who can 
show that a drug is defective has more work to do before she 
wins: She must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
defect caused the consequence she experienced.188 Drugs almost 
never inflict a signature harm. When they increase risks of 
injury, whatever they cause usually could have occurred without 
exposure to the drug.189 Exposure and injury are not enough for 
courts to conclude that the former caused the later.190 
Vioxx offers an example of the problem. According to expert 
estimates, tens of thousands of individuals, perhaps 139,000, 
“suffered cardiac arrests that they would not have suffered 
absent Vioxx exposure. But who?”191 Personal injury doctrine 
applies the preponderance standard to conclude that nobody may 
recover.192 Merck had a different experience with Vioxx, of course, 
                                                                                                     
 187.  See Davis, supra note 183, at 1091 (“[M]ore exacting state tort law 
standards of care do not conflict, but operate concurrently with the federal 
requirements.”).  
 188.  See Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1200 (6th Cir. 
1988) (describing each individual plaintiff’s responsibility to show “his or her 
specific injuries or damages were proximately caused” by the defendant).  
 189.  See id. at 1235–36 (emphasizing the importance of physicians’ 
differential diagnosis testimony in proving specific causation); Michel Auriche & 
Elizabeth Loupi, Does Proof of Causality Ever Exist in Pharmacovigilance?, 9 
DRUG SAFETY 230, 230 (1993) (illustrating the non-uniqueness of drug defect 
injuries).  
 190.  See Barbara J. Evans, Seven Pillars of a New Evidentiary Paradigm: 
The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act Enters the Genomic Era, 85 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 419, 438 (2010) (explaining that correlation studies are useful, but 
insufficient to show causation).  
 191.  Nora Freeman Engstrom, The Lessons of Lone Pine, 129 YALE L.J. 2, 49 
(2019). 
 192.  See Keith A. Findley, Defining Innocence, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1157, 1203 
(2011) (“[T]he preponderance standard typically defines that [proof of innocence] 
quantum in personal injury actions.”).  
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and agreed to a $4.85 billion settlement after losing a few 
bellwether trials that followed aggregation.193  
 Going down the MDL road with a large settlement at the end 
of the journey is an exception rather than the rule, however. Most 
plaintiffs are stuck with doctrine that leaves them 
uncompensated when they cannot fulfill an element of their claim 
and once again we see Almost No Bad Drugs as a bottom-line 
result accounted for with reference to a barrier that seems 
neutral. Plaintiffs lose because courts apply preemption doctrine 
to their claims, we learned, and because Restatement blackletter 
makes it hard for them to win.194 Now they lose also because their 
claims fail on causation.  
Must they? Different causation doctrine—like different 
decisional law on preemption and different Restatement  
rules — would permit these persons to succeed. Denying 
compensation for harm whose existence is certain in the 
aggregate on the ground that individual plaintiffs cannot prove 
that the harm happened to them not only disadvantages hurt 
persons but also nurtures pollution and social disutility.195 
Scholars have proposed alternatives to the pro-defendant 
causation status quo.196 In addition to the untaken option of 
contrary tort rules, different understandings of professional 
responsibility could require defense lawyers, consistent with their 
duty of candor to the court, to acknowledge that a dangerous drug 
caused injury at large notwithstanding the absence of evidence 
that it injured a particular individual.197  
                                                                                                     
 193.  Engstrom, supra note 191, at 51.  
 194.  See supra Parts III.A and III.B. 
 195.  See Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of Toxic 
Products, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 773, 775–76 (1997).    
 196.  See, e.g., id. at 833–40 (developing a standard that would (1) place the 
initial burden on manufacturers to show that they have conducted “minimal 
safety testing” on their products and (2) entitle plaintiffs to a presumption that 
an insufficiently tested product caused the harm); Engstrom, supra note 191, at 
49 n.205 (giving as examples explicitly probabilistic causation, abandonment of 
the entire element of the prima facia case, and replacement of tort with a 
legislative-administrative compensation program). 
 197.  See Frank M. McClellan, The Vioxx Litigation: A Critical Look at Trial 
Tactics, the Court System, and the Role of Lawyers in Mass Tort Litigation, 57 
DEPAUL L. REV. 509, 525–30 (2008) (juxtaposing the competing responsibilities 
of candor to the court and loyalty to the client).  
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Causation doctrine is the subtlest of the three sources of 
near-total products liability immunity for pharmaceuticals 
surveyed here. The Third Restatement and the rise of preemption 
have long been characterized in law review writing as 
tendentious activism that favors defendants.198 Both the Third 
Restatement and vigorous preemption are younger than the old 
school negligence prima facie case,199 which makes their political 
antecedents easier to observe. Saddling plaintiffs with the cost of 
uncertainty or ignorance about causation appears on the surface 
conservative in a less partisan sense of the term.  
IV. Questionable Beliefs and Premises Support the Supports 
To review: Doctrinal barriers between injured consumers and 
redress in court surveyed in the last Part are not fixed facts of 
nature. Alternatives to all three of them—that is, oppositions to 
Restatement stances, preemption in its current ascendancy, and 
causation as a burden on plaintiffs—amply exist.200 I move here 
to a second-order explanation of near-total products liability 
immunity for pharmaceuticals. Why these anti-plaintiff 
conditions persist in the face of articulate and principled 
opposition is the subject of this Part, whose headings recite shaky 
beliefs. 
                                                                                                     
 198.  See, e.g., George W. Conk, Punctuated Equilibrium: Why Section 402A 
Flourished and the Third Restatement Languished, 26 REV. LITIG. 799, 804–06 
(2007) (arguing that the Third Restatement’s revision of products liability has 
fallen especially severely on consumers of medical products); Catherine M. 
Sharkey, The Anti-Deference Pro-Preemption Paradox at the U.S. Supreme 
Court: The Business Community Weighs In, 67 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 805, 835–36 
(2017) (adverting to a strong stance on preemption of drug and medical device 
claims by the Product Liability Advisory Council, a trade association of 
manufacturers). 
 199.  Cf. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 470–72 (2d 
ed. 1985) (discussing the history of modern causation doctrine); Robert Cary, 
Torts: Playing the Blame Game: The Division of Fault Between Negligent Parties 
in Minnesota—Daly v. McFarland, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 275, 278 (2012) 
(remarking that the history of this prima facie case spans many years and court 
decisions).  
 200.  See supra Parts III.A–III.C. 
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A. “We Don’t Need Liability, Because Consumers Can’t Buy This 
Product Without a Learned Permission Slip.” 
Federal law in the United States provides that a prospective 
user needs permission from a licensed prescriber before she can 
buy a prescription drug.201 Mandatory cooperation from a 
well-informed third party to make sales of this product lawful 
suggests that dangerous products can—again, at least in 
principle—be kept from harming consumers without any need for 
judicial condemnation.202 Personal injury law that governs other 
products presupposes only a willing seller and buyer as needed to 
deliver an object alleged to have caused injury. Most of the time, 
nobody stands between the decision to sell and the impulse to 
buy. 
This pillar underlying current law posits a barrier that 
distinguishes this product from others. Working at a professional 
distance from both buyer and seller, an expert has the power to 
veto a purchase of this good. Physicians and nurse practitioners 
who fulfill this barrier role with discernment and vigilance fend 
off danger. If consumers can acquire this product and ingest it 
without the learned approval that federal law demands, a 
premise about safety gets weaker. 
They can. Strong evidence for the scalable prescription wall 
comes from the General Accounting Office (GAO), the federal 
agency tasked with assessing costs and benefits of federal 
policy.203 The GAO has investigated breaches of the prescription 
wall between drug buyers and sellers.204 Vendors sell prescription 
drugs to customers who lack prescriptions, the GAO has 
confirmed.205 They also dispense prescriptions that are sham in 
                                                                                                     
 201.  21 U.S.C. § 829 (2018). 
 202.  Cf. KATHRYN B. ARMSTRONG & JENNIFER A. STAMAN, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R43609, ENFORCEMENT OF THE FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT: SELECT 
LEGAL ISSUES 3–6 (2018) (explaining federal agency enforcement as provided in 
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act).  
 203.  See About GAO, U.S. GOV’T ACC. OFFICE, https://perma.cc/HSJ2-M828 
(last visited Oct. 14, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 204.  See U.S. GEN. ACC. OFFICE, GAO-01-69, INTERNET PHARMACIES: ADDING 
DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS WOULD AID STATE AND FEDERAL OVERSIGHT 10–11 
(2000), https://perma.cc/P4SF-SXNB (PDF) [hereinafter GAO DISCLOSURE] 
(detailing the GAO investigation). 
 205.  See id. at 11 (explaining that at least twenty-five internet pharmacies 
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the sense of originating with these vendors rather than the 
buyer’s physician and lacking attention to the welfare of the 
buyer as a patient.206 In a series of separate reports, all titled 
“Internet Pharmacies” followed by a subtitle, the GAO has 
focused mostly on problems other than the scalable prescription 
wall (for example counterfeit drugs and authentic but inadvisable 
drugs sold online,207 and the difficulty of holding offshore 
suppliers to United States law208) but along the way it has 
confirmed the widely held belief that what one needs to buy 
prescription drugs is less a doctor’s note than a browser and a 
credit card.209  
If you, Reader, want proof of a sort about widespread 
distribution of prescription drugs away from oversight by 
patients’ physicians, peek at the spam that your web-based 
e-mail account filtered lately. I am writing about a fast-changing 
issue and so this generalization may be obsolete by the time you 
read it, but at the moment prescription drugs have been flogged 
aggressively online for decades without letup.210 A research 
assistant generously risked drawing unwanted electronic 
attention to himself (I did warn him about the danger211) by 
                                                                                                     
included in the GAO study dispensed prescription drugs without prescriptions).  
 206.  See id. at 12–13 (“The ability to buy prescription drugs from Internet 
pharmacies not licensed in the state where the customer is located and without 
appropriate physician supervision, including an examination, means that 
important safeguards related to the doctor/patient relationship and intrinsic to 
conventional prescribing are bypassed.”). 
 207.  See id. at 11 (“Internet pharmacies place consumers at risk from 
counterfeit or unapproved drugs, or drugs that were manufactured or stored 
under poor conditions.”). 
 208.  See U.S. GEN. ACC. OFFICE, GAO-14-386T, INTERNET PHARMACIES: MOST 
ROGUE SITES OPERATE FROM ABROAD, AND MANY SELL COUNTERFEIT DRUGS 4–5 
(2014), https://perma.cc/F49G-H73U (PDF) (describing the mechanisms rogue 
internet pharmacies use to evade customs officials). 
 209.  See GAO DISCLOSURE, supra note 204, at 11 (highlighting that 
individuals were able to obtain prescriptions with as little information as a 
credit card).  
 210.  See Robert F. Forman, Narcotics on the Net: The Availability of 
Websites Selling Controlled Substances, 57 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 24, 25 (2006) 
(characterizing illicit online drug sales as a challenge for substance-abuse 
treatment). 
 211.  See generally FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET 
ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015) (assembling 
evidence that businesses gather data about what individuals search and then 
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typing “ambien without prescription” and “viagra without 
prescription” into the search box in the upper right corner of his 
computer screen. His hit count was 3.6 million and 5.2 million 
respectively. Your mileage will vary but everyone’s total will be 
large. 
Some attempts to scale the prescription wall with an internet 
connection admittedly do fail.212 The GAO found gaps between 
the number of purported sellers and the quantities of drugs 
delivered.213 One of its studies identified thirteen popular 
prescription drugs, including the opioids OxyContin and 
Percocet—as well as blander stuff like Lipitor—and set out to 
place up to ten orders of each product from an array of online 
pharmacies located both inside and outside the U.S.214 The GAO 
obtained sixty-eight units in its harvest, representing eleven of 
the thirteen drugs, but did not receive six orders it had paid 
for.215  
Even taking into account this failure rate, however, the 
GAO’s research provides ample data to refute the pillar-premise 
that prudent and well-schooled intermediaries familiar with their 
patients’ bodies shelter them from the consequences of an 
improvident desire to buy and consume a dangerous product. 
“Most of the drugs—45 of 68—were obtained without a 
patient-provided prescription.”216 The GAO designed its study to 
include drugs that call particularly for learned-intermediary 
attention because their side effects can be severe or their 
                                                                                                     
exploit this information for profit). 
 212.  See GAO DISCLOSURE, supra note 204, at 14 (describing increased 
enforcement efforts by the Justice Department).  
 213.  See U.S. GEN. ACC. OFFICE, GAO-04-888T, INTERNET PHARMACIES: SOME 
POSE SAFETY RISKS FOR CONSUMERS AND ARE UNRELIABLE IN THEIR BUSINESS 
PRACTICES 4 (2004), https://perma.cc/BP2N-6L2X (PDF) [hereinafter GAO 
BUSINESS PRACTICES] (noting that researchers were able to obtain the “majority” 
but not all of the requested prescriptions).  
 214.  See id. at 2 (explaining that most Internet pharmacies purported or 
appeared to be located in the United States, Canada, “and other foreign 
countries”). 
 215.  See id. at 17 (noting that the six unreceived orders “were for Clozaril, 
Humulin N, and Vicodin, and cost over $700 in total”). Several of the shipments 
arrived in shaky shape, without necessary temperature controls or in punctured 
blister packs. Id. at 4–5.  
 216.  Id. at 7.  
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potential for abuse and addiction is high.217 Buyers easily scaled 
the prescription wall to acquire drugs that really do need a 
barrier between demand and supply for the sake of safety, in 
short, at least circa 2004 when the GAO published “Business 
Practices.” In the ensuing decade and a half, no significant 
change to law and regulation has made prescription drugs harder 
to buy without a learned permission slip. 
Consumers scale the prescription wall not only by buying 
online but also by traveling. In 1992 the now defunct (but 
peer-reviewed and to this day respectably indexed on the 
National Institutes of Health website) Western Journal of 
Medicine published a study by two El Paso-based physicians who 
investigated their patients’ habit of crossing the border to acquire 
prescription medications.218 Most respondents surveyed said they 
bought drugs in Mexico, citing as their reasons lower prices and 
their ability to make purchases without a prescription.219  
Similar to the ease of buying pharmaceutical products online, 
apparently unchanged since the GAO study of 2004, the appeal of 
traveling from the United States to Mexico for prescription drugs 
also persists, as a tour through travel websites will confirm.220 
Mexican law treats a few drugs as stringently controlled 
substances and will not permit their sale to visitors without a 
Mexican prescription,221 but American tourists report easily 
buying over the counter a range of drugs that are 
prescription-only in the United States and paying only a fraction 
of the northern price.222 
                                                                                                     
 217.  See id. (stating that “physician supervision is of particular importance 
[for particular drugs] due to the possibility of severe side effects . . . .”).  
 218.  Paul R. Casner & Luis G. Guerra, Purchasing Prescription Medication 
in Mexico Without a Prescription: The Experience at the Border, 165 W.J. MED. 
458, 512 (1992). 
 219.  See id. at 513 (“81% stated that they had purchased medications in 
Mexico at one time or another, and 79% stated they were still [at that time] 
purchasing medications in Mexico.”).  
 220.  See Judy Hedding, Buying Prescription Drugs in Mexico, TRIPSAVVY, 
https://perma.cc/9XRY-E98C (last updated Dec. 31, 2018) (last visited Oct. 14, 
2019) (providing tips for travelers going to Mexico to buy prescriptions) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 221.  See id. (warning that although consumers may purchase most drugs in 
Mexico, it is illegal to carry them over the U.S. border without a prescription). 
 222.  See id. (noting that most American tourist-purchasers are from states 
with convenient access to the Mexican border, primarily “Arizonians, 
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B. “We Don’t Need Liability, Because Medically Informed 
Expertise Controls the Selection of Prescribed Therapies.” 
Very strong immunity rests on faith in expert knowledge.223 
Applied to the products liability category of failure to warn, this 
faith supports the learned intermediary rule, a doctrine that 
directs drug sellers to relay their warnings to physicians rather 
than patients—and that also withholds redress from patients who 
were not themselves warned—on the ground that physicians are 
abler than patients to understand the risks and the benefits of a 
particular drug therapy.224 Although the Third Restatement 
expresses cautious support for warning patients directly about 
some drug risks,225 judge-written exceptions to the learned 
intermediary rule that entitle consumers to receive warnings 
about the drugs they ingest remain rare.226  
Deference to learned intermediaries also curbs design-defect 
liability.227 Just as expert knowledge enables physicians to 
construe a warning intelligently and tailor the message in it to 
meet the needs of their patients, so too does that authority guide 
them to eschew unsound design in a drug and decline to prescribe 
it.228 Section 6(c) of the Third Restatement writes esteem for 
expert knowledge into its blackletter.229 Its test for design defect 
                                                                                                     
Californians, New Mexicans, and Texans”). 
 223.  See infra Parts IV.B.1 and IV.B.2 (addressing the role of expert 
physicians to cure demand-side and supply-side ignorance). 
 224.  OWEN, supra note 20, at 608. 
 225.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(d)(2) (AM. 
LAW INST. 1998) (providing that a manufacturer must warn the patient directly 
when it has reason to know that health care providers will not be able to reduce 
the risks about which warnings would give information).  
 226.  See OWEN, supra note 20, at 610–14 (examining three exceptions—mass 
immunization programs, birth control pills, and direct-to-consumer 
advertising — where courts have written in an exception for the learned 
intermediary doctrine). 
 227.  See Richard C. Ausness, When Warnings Alone Won’t Do: A Reply to 
Professor Phillips, 26 N. KY. L. REV. 627, 647 (1999) (“I would conclude that the 
FDA’s strict licensing process and the availability of trained personnel to serve 
as learned intermediaries provide adequate protection for consumers.”).  
 228.  See id. at 651 (noting that almost all jurisdictions recognize the learned 
intermediary doctrine as an efficient way to pass information to patients).  
 229.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(c) (AM. LAW 
INST. 1998) (discussing the foreseeability of harm).  
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posits “reasonable health-care providers” who know the 
“foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits” of the pharmaceutical 
products they prescribe.230 Although very few—arguably  
zero—courts have accepted the pro-defendant Section 6(c) test for 
design defect,231 for this kind of defect the bottom line of almost 
no liability is consistent with a deference hypothesis.  
Learned intermediaries, who populate defective-warning law 
officially and defective-design law, by tacit consensus that 
non-learned persons lack authority to opine on a molecular 
configuration, are understood to look out for the purchaser’s 
interests through efforts that include, but are not limited to, their 
veto.232 Their presumed refusal to supply prescription drugs that 
will do more harm than good is only the beginning of their work. 
According to this pillar-premise applied to failure to warn, 
learned intermediaries follow up on their initial prescription 
decisions by monitoring the health of the consuming patient and 
maintain big-picture awareness of how each prescribed drug 
interacts with other medications that the patient takes.233 
To the extent that ignorance, rather than “learned” anything, 
guides decisions about buying and consuming a prescription drug, 
this rationale for the current pro-defendant state of doctrine 
becomes weaker. The word ignorance here refers to low levels of 
knowledge pertinent to the question of whether to choose or reject 
a therapeutic agent. Ignorance about prescription drugs is most 
obviously present within the lay patient as decider—I’ll call this 
                                                                                                     
 230.  Id. 
 231.  See cases cited supra notes 136–157 and accompanying text. 
 232.  See Richard B. Goetz & Karen R. Growdon, A Defense of the Learned 
Intermediary Doctrine, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 421, 434 (2008) (“The physician 
helps the patient understand which possible risks are most pertinent to the 
patient’s specific situation.”); see also Richard C. Ausness, Will More Aggressive 
Marketing Practices Lead to Greater Tort Liability for Prescription Drug 
Manufacturers?, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 97, 109 (2002) (claiming that a 
medically trained prescriber is more capable than a patient to choose the right 
prescription drugs). 
 233.  See Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir. 1974) (“The 
choice [a prescribing physician] makes is an informed one, an individualized 
medical judgment bottomed on a knowledge of both patient and palliative.”); see 
also Timothy S. Hall, Reimagining the Learned Intermediary Rule for the New 
Pharmaceutical Marketplace, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 193, 242–43 (2004) (noting 
that for the rule to work, a patient must “have an ongoing opportunity to engage 
the physician in a dialogue about the efficacy of the treatment prescribed”). 
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the condition of “demand-side ignorance”—but physicians also 
manifest it. 
1. Demand-side Ignorance 
Laypeople have no way to know much about the benefits and 
risks of prescription drugs they consume, and the rise of 
direct-to-consumer advertising has increased the consequences of 
their naïveté.234 To say that when American drug sellers bypass 
physician intermediaries and promote their wares directly to the 
public they exploit and foment ignorance calls for some caution. 
The statement is correct enough, but a point of history deserves 
mention.  
When it was newly formed, the American Medical 
Association, which tasks itself with speaking for physicians in the 
United States,235 embraced scorn for all therapies “advertised 
directly to the laity” long before it ever insisted on clinical 
evidence for safety and effectiveness as necessary for a 
pharmaceutical product to deserve respectable dispensation.236 
Nineteenth-century therapeutic drugs fell into two groups. The 
“ethical” kind got listed somberly in a book called the United 
States Pharmacopoeia.237 Patent medicines, whose undisclosed 
ingredients were mostly water, occupied the other category.238  
                                                                                                     
 234.  See Julie Donohue, A History of Drug Advertising: The Evolving Roles 
of Consumers and Consumer Protection, 84 MILBANK Q. 659, 677 (2006) (“A 
letter published in the New England Journal of Medicine said that DTC 
[advertising] ‘may tend to undermine physician control over prescribing’ and 
that ‘most lay people are ill equipped to evaluate the efficacy or toxicity of 
drugs.’”). 
 235.  See Hayley Rosenman, Note, Patients’ Rights to Access Their Medical 
Records: An Argument for Uniform Recognition of a Right of Access in the United 
States and Australia, 21 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1500, 1508 n.59 (1998) (citing the 
AMA’s Membership Facts). 
 236.  Donohue, supra note 234, at 665. 
 237.  See id. at 664 (explaining that “ethical pharmaceuticals” were not 
advertised to consumers in part because of the efforts of organized medicine). 
 238.  See id. (“Patent medicine . . . advertisements routinely made 
exaggerated claims about the effectiveness of their products and seldom 
disclosed their ingredients or risks.”). 
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We moderns would probably not wish to swallow Lydia 
Pinkham’s Vegetable Compound or “Kick-a-poo Indian Sagwa”239 
for what ails us, but the other nineteenth-century category was 
not much better: Today only a few drugs listed in the first edition 
of the buttoned-down Pharmacopoeia, published in 1820, are 
regarded as safe and effective.240 Neither the 1900 decision of the 
Journal of the American Medical Association that urged 
physician readers not to prescribe any therapeutic agent sold by 
its maker directly to the lay public, nor its decree of the same 
approximate date that medical journals must reject 
advertisements for that type of product, originated in clinical 
rigor. This caveat noted, a 1997 shift certainly enlarged ignorance 
in the selection of prescription therapies by easing a particular 
type of direct-to-consumer advertising.241  
American drug law never barred drug manufacturers from 
speaking directly to patients about their products, but throughout 
almost all the twentieth century pharmaceutical manufacturers 
confined their marketing efforts to physicians.242 After the rise of 
a consumer movement in the 1970s that encouraged patients to 
think of themselves as buyers entitled to information, drug 
manufacturers shifted their efforts to speak to this customer 
base.243 The FDA’s 1997 announcement of conditions that in its 
view made broadcast direct-to-consumer advertising acceptable 
encouraged these businesses to move their spending into 
television commercials.244 The 1997 directive, in place for the 
                                                                                                     
 239.  See id. (giving examples of patent medicines sold under trademarked 
names). 
 240.  See id. (listing “digitalis, morphine, quinine, diphtheria antitoxin, 
aspirin, and ether”). 
 241.  See id. at 685–86 (detailing the FDA’s 1997 Draft Guidance, which 
permitted broadcast advertisements of prescription drugs). 
 242.  See id. (identifying a shift in the early 1900s wherein the AMA’s focus 
centered on deference to professional medical judgment). 
 243.  See Livia Gershon, Should Drug Makers Advertise?, JSTOR DAILY (Mar. 
8, 2018), https://perma.cc/K4XG-FQ6K (last visited Oct. 27, 2019) (“[I]n the ‘70s, 
new consumer rights groups like Ralph Nader’s Public Citizen began agitating 
for more patient-directed information, resulting in the requirement of patient 
package inserts.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 244.  Wayne L. Pines, DTC TV Ad Policy Faces Challenges, FDA ADVERT. & 
PROMOTION MANUAL NEWSL., June 2017, at 20. 
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most part today, rested on a belief that compliance would curb 
deception and manipulation in these communications.245  
When a team at Yale University undertook to review all 
English-language direct-to-consumer advertisements aired in the 
United States from January 2015 to 2016 to investigate how well 
they hew to FDA criteria,246 the researchers disapproved of what 
they found: “Few broadcast DTC ads were fully compliant with 
FDA guidelines. The overall quality of information provided in 
ads was low, and suggestions of off-label promotion”247—a move 
that flat-out violates the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act as 
it is understood by the FDA and in the courts248—“were common 
for diabetes medications.”249 The 2017 expenditure of $6.1 billion 
on direct-to-consumer advertising bought a great deal of 
(mis)communication.250 Back in the late 1990s, when both the 
FDA advertising directive and Restatement were new, drug 
                                                                                                     
 245.  See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: 
CONSUMER-DIRECTED BROADCAST ADVERTISEMENTS 2 (1999), 
https://perma.cc/EV2N-V4GU (PDF) (“The approach presumes that such 
advertisements . . . . [p]resent a fair balance between information about 
effectiveness and information about risk . . . . [and] [c]ommunicate all 
information relevant to the product’s indication (including limitations to use) in 
consumer-friendly language.”). 
 246.  Kristina Klara et al., Direct-to-Consumer Broadcast Advertisements for 
Pharmaceuticals: Off-label Promotion and Adherence to FDA Guidelines, 33 J. 
GEN. INTERNAL MED. 651 (2018). 
 247.  Id. 
 248.  See, e.g., In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 712 F.3d 21 
(1st Cir. 2013) (prohibiting fraudulent or misleading marketing of off-label uses 
for FDA-approved drugs); United States ex rel. Bergman v. Abbot [sic] Labs., 
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THAT ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE FDA-REQUIRED LABELING—QUESTIONS AND 
ANSWERS: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY (2018) https://perma.cc/WHL4-XGUH (PDF) 
[hereinafter MEDICAL PRODUCT COMMUNICATIONS]. 
 249.  Klara, supra note 246, at 655.  
 250.  See Laura Entis, DTC Pharma Ad Spending Slipped 4.6% in 2017: 
Kantar, MM&M (Mar. 12, 2018), https://perma.cc/FS3L-DYQZ (last visited Oct. 
27, 2019) (reporting that magazine and digital advertisement spending suffered 
big hits and fell 22.7% and 34.4% respectively) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review); but see Beth Snyder Bulik, AbbVie, Pfizer Drive 2017 Pharma 
Ad Spending Above 2016’s Tally, FIERCEPHARMA (Jan. 12, 2018, 11:39 AM), 
https://perma.cc/5Z9F-AXCQ (last visited Oct. 27, 2019) (reporting that pharma 
spending on national television advertisements in 2017 climbed by more than 
$330 million from the previous year) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
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manufacturers had spent much less on this advertising.251 
Whatever quantity of consumer confusion and ignorance these 
ads sow is correlatively much greater now.  
 Readers who have seen commercials for drugs on television 
might feel inclined to shrug because the products advertised in 
this medium are so banal. Prescription drugs for heartburn, hay 
fever, and high cholesterol may or may not be well formulated but 
they seem unlikely to end up accused in court of defectiveness, if 
only because it is hard to imagine them doing enough mischief to 
draw contingent-fee litigation.  
But this industry, which takes a MeToo approach to 
intellectual-property innovation,252 favors familiarity and 
repetition also in its efforts to increase sales.253 Drug 
manufacturers habitually return to old products and old 
approaches to marketing rather than try something new, and 
their recourse to direct-to-consumer television advertising has 
followed the same pattern: allergies on TV yesterday, more of the 
same plus cancer and Alzheimer’s disease added today.254 A 
newer arrival in the roster of television-commercial conditions, 
constipation that results from heavy use of opioids, seems to hark 
back to the old era because constipation is only discomfort, not a 
fatal illness.255 Not all versions of this gastric condition have the 
same import for products liability law, however. Targeting new 
                                                                                                     
 251.  See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PROMOTIONAL SPENDING FOR PRESCRIPTION 
DRUGS 1 (2009) https://perma.cc/6KQT-K5ZF (PDF) (“Until the late 1990s, 
pharmaceutical manufacturers confined their marketing efforts largely to 
physicians and other health care providers.”). 
 252.  See infra Part IV.D.1. 
 253.  See Kalman Applbaum, Pharmaceutical Marketing and the Invention of 
the Medical Consumer, 3 PLOS MED. 445, 446 (2006), 
https://perma.cc/LF43-44BP (PDF) (“Promoting consumer familiarity with drugs 
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 254.  See Bruce Horovitz & Julie Appleby, Prescription Drug Costs Are Up; 
So Are TV Ads Promoting Them, USA TODAY (Mar. 16, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/X6PK-XAGJ (last visited Oct. 27, 2019) (“For years, the DTC 
industry was mostly focused on drugs that relieved long-term, typically 
non-fatal afflictions like heartburn (Nexium), allergies (Claritin) and high 
cholesterol (Lipitor).”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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illnesses affecting seniors, such as Alzheimer’s disease. Ads for drugs that target 
constipation caused by other drugs—opioids—hit the scene last year, reflecting 
the large numbers of people taking painkillers.”).  
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drug advertisements to a population whose judgment is relatively 
likely to be impaired by dependency or addiction will, ceteris 
paribus, increase risks in the aggregate. Unwise choices refute 
the understanding—stated expressly in the Third Restatement 
and held tacitly elsewhere—that “reasonable health-care 
providers” who know about “foreseeable risks and therapeutic 
benefits” steer the rudder of the drug-decision ship.256 
As for the effects of demand-side ignorance in particular, 
direct-to-consumer advertising received early praise as an 
alleviator of this problem in the commercial-speech decision 
known informally as Virginia Pharmacy,257 which, in 1976, 
invalidated on First Amendment grounds a state prohibition on 
pharmacists’ advertising the price of prescription drugs.258 
Virginia’s prohibition of advertising meant that consumers had 
been “kept in ignorance,” wrote Justice Blackmun for the 
Court.259 Today, direct-to-consumer advertising does indeed relay 
some useful information to laypeople who benefit from what they 
learn.260  
But it also misinforms. According to one review, this genre of 
advertising implicitly and unhelpfully denies that behavior 
modification could work better than a drug to alleviate the 
patient’s medical condition.261 Half the consumers who responded 
to a survey reported their inaccurate belief that drug ads must be 
approved by the government before they may air.262 FDA 
                                                                                                     
 256.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(c) (AM. LAW 
INST. 1998).  
 257.  Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748 (1976). 
 258.  See id. at 776–77 (holding that the ban could not be justified on the 
basis of Virginia’s interest in “maintaining a high degree of professionalism on 
the part of licensed pharmacists”). 
 259.  Id. at 769. 
 260.  See C. Lee Ventola, Direct-to-Consumer Pharmaceutical Advertising: 
Therapeutic or Toxic?, 36 PHARMACY & THERAPEUTICS 669, 673 (citing evidence 
that exposure to advertising enlarges the dialogue between patients and 
physicians, and causes “small, but statistically significant” increases in patient 
compliance). 
 261.  See id. at 674 (“By promoting a drug as the solution to a health 
problem, these advertisements may lead viewers to believe that adopting 
healthy behaviors, such as a good diet and exercise, are ineffective or 
unnecessary.”). 
 262.  See id. (confirming that consumers “place unwarranted trust in DTC 
(ALMOST) NO BAD DRUGS 51 
disciplinary records identify a pattern related to the focus of this 
Article: In the aggregate, advertisements targeted to consumers 
overstate the benefits and understate the detriments of 
prescription drugs.263 
Even “ask your doctor,” the helpful-sounding tagline that has 
dangled on many ads for decades,264 turns out misinformative on 
the ground. For starters, there isn’t much time to ask. 
Researchers estimate that the average American consumer 
spends many more hours a year hearing drug commercials than 
talking to a physician.265 Although a perception that the number 
of minutes per office visit has been dropping is not accurate,266 
physicians consistently report in surveys that they lack enough 
time in office visits, especially for preventive care.267 
In 1995, when the current direct-to-consumer advertising era 
was young, the FDA contrasted what it intends “ask your doctor” 
to mean with how patients interpret this phrase.268 The FDA said 
it wants to warn consumers that “specific vigilance” is necessary 
for a safe and effective encounter with this product—in other 
words, that they should ask their doctors for the guidance they 
                                                                                                     
ads”). 
 263.  See id. (stating DTC advertisements encourage drug over-utilization 
and promote new drugs before safety profiles and adverse effects are fully 
known). 
 264.  See Sidney Kessler et al., The Genesis of Robitussin’s “Ask Your Doctor” 
Campaign—The Prevalent Theme of Pharmaceutical Advertising for Four 
Decades, 9 INNOVATIVE MARKETING 69, 69–75 (2013). 
 265.  See David C. Vladeck, The Difficult Case of Direct to Consumer Drug 
Advertising, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 259, 269–70 (2007) (“[T]he average American 
now views ‘as many as 16 hours of prescription drug advertisements per year, 
far exceeding the average time spent with a primary care physician.’”). 
 266.  See Meredith K. Shaw et al., The Duration of Office Visits in the United 
States, 1993 to 2010, AM. J. MANAGED CARE (Oct. 16, 2014), 
https://perma.cc/A2VG-DC3J (last visited Nov. 1, 2019) (“From 1993 through 
2010, reported visit duration increased over time from 17.9 minutes to 20.3 
minutes for primary care visits (P <.001) and from 19.0 minutes to 21.0 minutes 
for specialized visits (P <.001).”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 267.  See id. (“Time constraints are one of the most cited reasons by 
physicians for not providing preventive care as often as guidelines would 
dictate.”). 
 268.  See Public Hearing Notice, 60 Fed. Reg. 42,581 (Aug. 16, 1995) 
(soliciting patient feedback on the direct-to-consumer promotion of prescription 
drugs to better understand their views and concerns). 
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need269—but consumers hear “general reassurance” that the 
advertised drug will treat their conditions safely and effectively. 
“Ask your doctor” comes across to consumers as “seek this 
product from the authority figure who can give it to you.” One 
study asked patients what they would do if they requested a 
prescription and their doctor refused.270 Almost half of 
respondents hewed to the FDA ideal by saying they would accept 
this answer, but a quarter said they would try to talk the doctor 
into complying and another quarter said they would seek the 
prescription from another provider.271 
Online ratings of physicians, written and posted (ostensibly) 
by patients, increase the impact of demand-side ignorance.272 
These scores and commentary undeniably furnish pertinent 
information. Old school personal referrals on which patients 
would otherwise have to rely could omit or downplay what they 
want to know; testimony about experiences in a medical office can 
have unique value for prospective patients who peruse online 
lists of providers.273 As judgments of physician competence, 
however, these reviews give wrong answers. One recent study of 
physicians in eight specialties found that although consumer 
ratings are consistent across platforms, they do not align with 
better-informed assessments of physician quality, including 
expert-written performance measures, peer-review scores by 
                                                                                                     
 269.  See Barbara J. Tyler & Robert A. Cooper, Blinded by the Hype: Shifting 
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Prescription Drugs, 21 VT. L. REV. 1073, 1097 (1998) (urging readers that 
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 270.  Michael S. Wilkes et al., Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug 
Advertising, Trends, Impact, and Implications, 19 HEALTH AFFAIRS 110, 119 
(2000).  
 271.  See id. (reporting that “25 percent [of people] anticipated that they 
would try to change their physician’s mind, 24 percent thought that they might 
attempt to obtain the prescription from a different doctor, and 15 percent 
thought that they might switch to a new doctor”). 
 272.  See Andrew Ibbotson, Patients Trust Online Reviews As Much As Doctor 
Recommendations (And Other Shocking Facts About Transparency in 
Healthcare), HEALTH IT OUTCOMES (Nov. 9, 2018), https://perma.cc/J62Y-2T44 
(last visited Nov. 1, 2019) (“When asked if they trusted online ratings and 
reviews more than personal recommendations, 83.3 percent of patients said 
yes.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 273.   See id. (attributing patients’ trust in online reviews to “healthcare’s 
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(ALMOST) NO BAD DRUGS 53 
fellow physicians, and assessments by medical administrators.274 
Another study, published in 2012, reported a more alarming 
finding: High patient satisfaction ratings are associated with 
greater expenses and increased mortality.275 
If the providers who get graded were indifferent to their 
popularity scores, or if patients reliably refrained from lashing 
out at physicians who disappoint them by not giving them the 
drug they want in response to Ask Your Doctor, then patterns 
like these could be separated from the problem of demand-side 
ignorance as a source of personal injury. But providers experience 
these opinions as judgments that have power. In response to a 
study that went out as a survey to all physician members of a 
state-level medical society filled out anonymously online,276 most 
respondents reported that their compensation was linked to 
patient satisfaction and a large majority said that “patient 
satisfaction surveys moderately or severely affected their job 
satisfaction.”277 Of the fifty-two qualitative responses that came 
in, only three were positive.278  
Recall that a significant fraction of patients feel disappointed 
when their physicians decline to write the prescription they 
seek.279 This feeling of theirs does not escape would-be 
prescribers, as most of the 141 emergency room physicians who 
responded to a 2013 survey reported they felt pressure to write 
opioid prescriptions.280 Not all of it came from patient  
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(2014). 
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 278.  Id. 
 279.  Wilkes, supra note 270. 
 280.  See Sharon Kelly et al., “Pressured to Prescribe”: The Impact of 
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Managing the Drug Seeking Patient, 9 J. EMERGENCY TRAUMA SHOCK 58, 59 
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demand — respondents cited other factors, among them fear of 
civil liability and administrative concerns about adequate pain 
management281—but this pressure took several distinct forms. 
Respondents worried about patient complaints to state medical 
boards, patient complaints to the hospital administration, and 
reduced reimbursement based on lower patient satisfaction 
scores.282 Demand-side ignorance has a complement or partner on 
the supply side that makes its effects worse, to which we now 
turn. 
2. Supply-side Ignorance 
As was noted, the Products Liability Restatement speaks of 
“reasonable health-care providers” who know the “foreseeable 
risks and therapeutic benefits” of a prescription drug.283 This 
ideal sets a high standard. Busy clinicians who did not design the 
substances they prescribe cannot reasonably be expected to 
immerse themselves in the particulars of everything named in 
the current Physicians’ Desk Reference. What would a reasonable 
health care provider, licensed to write prescriptions under 
real-world conditions, achieve with respect to the selection and 
monitoring of a pharmaceutical course of action? Here are three 
plausible inclusions.  
This provider ought to know that which a reasonable 
provider knows about clinical medicine. Faced with a complaint 
or presentation in the examining room, our exemplar can identify 
the condition that calls for treatment and whether prescription 
drugs in a general sense (in contrast to the characteristics of any 
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criticism . . . .”). 
 281.  See id. at 61 (discussing several factors, including (1) physicians’ 
concerns that reporting “doctor shopping” patients to law enforcement could 
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“administrative expectations . . . that ED physicians will insure adequate pain 
management,” and (3) other “[r]egulatory concerns for over- and 
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failure to treat a patient’s pain could result in a potential board of medicine 
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 283.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(c) (AM. LAW 
INST. 1998).  
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particular product) exist to alleviate or improve it. She is 
competent to practice medicine, in short. One medical-journal 
paper about competence in cardiology speaks about clinical 
medicine generally when it calls for “proper application of science 
to individualized treatment decisions, based upon the compilation 
of historical clues, physical examination abnormalities, and 
laboratory results.”284 Whether contemporary physicians perform 
well or poorly on this front is unknown,285 because this 
profession, like most, does not insist on competence as a condition 
of retaining a license to practice.286  
Second, the competent provider needs knowledge of 
pharmacology to inform prescription choices.287 Questions she 
ought to be able to answer: How do pharmaceutical products 
address medical pathologies? What are the risks of interactions 
between multiple drugs that the patient is taking? When the 
patient reports or manifests a side effect from a drug, is this 
condition trivial or worrisome, and how should the provider 
respond?  
The record of American physicians and medical education in 
pharmacology is better known than their record of clinical skill. 
Better known, not better. The American College of Clinical 
Pharmacology published a position paper in 2015 decrying a 
current “dangerous lack of pharmacology education.”288 As the 
                                                                                                     
 284.  Mary Ellen Beliveau et al., Physician Competence: A Perspective from 
the Practicing Cardiologist, 10 METHODIST DEBAKEY CARDIOVASCULAR J. 50, 51 
(2014). 
 285.  So said an influential thinker in the field of health care quality 
assessment in a 1976 lecture, published decades later around the time of his 
death. See Avedis Donabedian, Evaluating Physician Competence, 78 BULL. 
WORLD HEALTH ORG. 857, 859 (2000) (“Testing for competence is a broad and 
complex subject in which I have no competence.”). 
 286.  See Alma Saravia, Determining Whether a Physician Is Competent to 
Practice Medicine Is Complex, HCPLIVE (Sept. 8, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/DN3J-D2WU (last visited Nov. 2, 2019) (“Physicians are 
granted a license to practice medicine and it is presumed they will remain 
‘competent’ to treat patients throughout their careers.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 287.  See Peter H. Wiernik, A Dangerous Lack of Pharmacology Education in 
Medical and Nursing Schools: A Policy Statement from the American College of 
Clinical Pharmacology, 55 J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 953, 953 (2015) 
(“Consequently, correct prescribing of medicines today requires a complete 
knowledge of the pharmacokinetics, pharmacodynamics . . . .”). 
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quantity of pharmaceuticals on the market has increased in 
recent years, medical schools and nursing schools in the United 
States — institutions where persons allowed to write 
prescriptions, physicians and nurse practitioners, are  
trained—have been reducing rather than increasing their 
coverage of pharmacology.289 European medical education 
manifests the same inadequacy, suggesting that transnational 
exchanges and collaborations cannot improve the problem in the 
near term.290  
Supply-side ignorance continues in a third domain pertinent 
to informed prescribing: knowledge of what to infer from factual 
data. For decades, scholars have lamented the skimpy command 
of foundations like statistical significance and Bayesian decision 
analysis that physicians and medical students possess, not only 
in the United States but around the world.291 Studies of the 
problem have focused on bad consequences that follow from 
physician confusion about what the results of laboratory tests 
mean292 and implications that extend to (mis)prescribing 
drugs.293 
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doctors’ knowledge of “elementary statistical expressions” like standard 
deviation); Susan Miles et al., Statistics Teaching in Medical School: Opinions of 
Practising Doctors, 10 BMC MED. EDUC. 75, 75 (2010) (summarizing a British 
survey of physicians that agreed on the need for better education in light of 
“advances in information technology and the increasing importance of 
evidence-based medicine”). 
 292.  See Bailey Kuklin, Probability Misestimates in Medical Care, 59 ARK. L. 
REV. 527, 528–36 (2006) (examining how patients’ treatments suffer as a result 
of common physician mistakes in probabilistic reasoning). 
 293.  See, e.g., Judith G. Edersheim & Theodore A. Stern, Liability 
Associated with Prescribing Medications, 11 PRIMARY CARE COMPANION J. 
CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 115, 115–19 (presenting a case scenario where a primary 
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Doctors learn about pharmaceutical products from sales 
representatives, sometimes called “detailers,” who visit their 
offices with samples, literature, and occasional gifts.294 A 2007 
medical journal paper reported that about 90,000 people worked 
in the United States as detailers whose employers spent an 
average of $15,000 per physician on this marketing.295 
Representatives not only sell their employers’ products but also 
purport “to provide busy physicians up-to-date information about 
the pros and cons of using the promoted drugs and to keep them 
abreast with the cutting-edge advances in the field in general,” 
writes a public health scholar, adding that “[t]he borderline 
between genuine recommendation and profit-oriented persuasion 
is thin.”296  
In its regulation of what detailers may tell physicians about 
the pharmaceutical items they promote, the FDA requires that 
these communications be consistent with what it has approved 
for the product.297 People who listen to detailing need the ability 
to hear what the sales representative is saying (and not saying) 
about the drug and to recognize artful claims about safety, 
effectiveness, or the suitability of the substance for classes of 
patients. Ignorance on their part makes this dialogue a source of 
danger. 
                                                                                                     
care physician might be liable for the injuries of his patient and the downstream 
harm to an innocent bystander injured in a motor vehicle accident a week after 
he prescribed his 80-year-old patient with heart disease and hypertension an 
“atypical antipsychotic medication” for his anxiety and insomnia). 
 294.  See Adriane Fugh-Berman & Shahram Ahari, Following the Script: 
How Drug Reps Make Friends and Influence Doctors, 4 PLOS MED. 621, 625 
(2007) (“Physicians view drug information provided by reps as a convenient, if 
not entirely reliable, educational service.”); see also Lars Noah, Doctors on the 
Take: Aligning Tort Law to Address Drug Company Payments to Prescribers, 66 
BUFF. L. REV. 855, 872–73 (2018) (exploring the influence of gifts on prescribers’ 
treatment decisions). 
 295.  Susan Chimonas et al., Physicians and Drug Representatives: Exploring 
the Dynamics of the Relationship, 22 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 184, 184 (2007). 
 296.  Avinash R. Patwardhan, Physicians-Pharmaceutical Sales 
Representatives Interactions and Conflict of Interest: Challenges and Solutions, 
53 INQUIRY 1, 1 (2016).  
 297.  See 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(1) (2008) (“Advertisements broadcast through 
media such as radio, television, or telephone communications systems shall 
include information relating to the major side effects and contraindications of 
the advertised drugs in the audio or audio and visual parts of the 
presentation . . . .”). 
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3. Enlarging Ignorance: Overpromotion 
The word overpromotion will sound relatively harmless to 
the American ear, which hears the prefix “over” as connoting too 
much of a good thing. Do it, but don’t overdo it. “Overdeception,” 
“overmistreatment,” and “overjeopardy” are not English nouns. If 
words like these existed, they would describe drug-manufacturer 
conduct more accurately than the anodyne “overpromotion.” 
Twenty-first century American overpromotion settlements 
are narratives replete with deception, mistreatment, and 
imperiling of patient welfare. Because overpromotion functions to 
tell physicians at best baselessly—and sometimes with clear 
intent to deceive—that a pharmaceutical product is safe and 
effective enough to treat a medical condition, as a behavior by 
drug manufacturers it increases supply-side ignorance by 
spreading and entrenching false information.  
Below I group together illustrative patterns of industry 
misconduct that came to light under the overpromotion rubric. In 
all of them, pharmaceutical manufacturers chose to settle civil 
and criminal actions under the False Claims Act and thereby 
conceded the truth of accusations—at least implicitly, but also on 
some occasions in the form of explicit admissions. These actions 
fall outside products liability, a domain in which there are 
(almost) no bad drugs, but they lost manufacturers money. 
Although prescription-drug overpromotion also took place well 
before the turn of the current century,298 the settlement accounts 
I have gathered are all younger than age fifteen, suggesting that 
the problem continues.  
Promotion for uses that a manufacturer knew would not 
work, or was told by the FDA that it could not lawfully 
recommend. After the FDA approved a drug called Actimmune to 
                                                                                                     
 298.  See, e.g., Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 507 P.2d 653, 662 (Cal. 1973) 
(faulting a manufacturer for “‘watering down’ its warnings and so 
over-promoting”); Proctor v. Davis, 682 N.E. 2d 1203, 1217 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) 
(awarding compensatory and punitive damages for a claim of defective warning 
that included overpromotion). For a review of drug overpromotion—now more 
than twenty years old, but informative—see Marilyn A. Moberg et al., Surfing 
the Net in Shallow Waters: Product Liability Concerns and Advertising on the 
Internet, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 213, 220–21 (1998) (addressing overpromotion as 
dilutive of FDA-approved warnings). 
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treat two rare conditions,299 its manufacturer launched research 
trials to learn whether Actimmune could also treat the more 
common disease of pulmonary fibrosis. These trials ended after 
evidence came in that Actimmune did not work for this 
purpose.300 Its manufacturer, InterMune, promoted this drug for 
pulmonary fibrosis anyway, and paid a $36.9 million settlement 
to resolve criminal and civil charges.301 In a much costlier 
example of this phenomenon, the manufacturer Amgen promoted 
its drug Aranesp at higher doses that the FDA had expressly 
rejected.302 Amgen’s settlement of overpromotion claims that 
covered Aranesp and two of its other products cost the company 
$612 million.303 
Promotion for pediatric uses that were never approved by the 
FDA, thereby putting young children at risk. Forest Laboratories 
promoted the antidepressant Celexa—approved by the FDA only 
for adult depression—as a treatment for children and 
adolescents.304 A $313 million settlement covered this 
overpromotion along with unlawful marketing of two other 
drugs.305 The FDA had approved Loprox for fungicide treatment 
                                                                                                     
 299.   See Andrew Pollack, Drug Maker Stops Work on Lung Disease 
Medicine, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2007), https://perma.cc/6P6S-EFZY (last visited 
Oct. 27, 2019) (“Actimmune, also known as interferon gamma, is approved to 
treat two extremely rare diseases—chronic granulomatous disease and severe 
malignant osteopetrosis.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 300.  See id. (reporting that the company halted the 826-patient trial after an 
interim analysis showed that 14.5% of the patients receiving Actimmune had 
died, compared to only 12.7% of those getting the placebo drug). 
 301.  The federal government charged InterMune with promoting an off-label 
use in violation of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Id.  
 302.  See Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Amgen 
Inc. Pleads Guilty to Federal Charge in Brooklyn, NY; Pays $762 Million to 
Resolve Criminal Liability and False Claims Act Allegations (Dec. 19, 2012), 
https://perma.cc/B2DJ-YWD5 (last visited Oct. 5, 2019) (noting that Amgen also 
tried to market Aranesp for an off-label treatment that the FDA had never 
approved) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 303.  Amgen also submitted false claims to government insurance programs 
for off-label uses of Enbrel and Neulasta. Id.  
 304.  See Natasha Singer, Forest, Maker of Celexa, to Pay More Than $313 
Million to Settle Marketing Case, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2010), 
https://perma.cc/M2M5-CDFW (last visited Oct. 27, 2019) (reporting that Forest 
illegally marketed the drug for off-label uses, including headaches and cerebral 
palsy in children and failed to disclose negative results of a study on Celexa in 
adolescents) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 305.  See id. (“In addition, federal prosecutors accused Forest of paying 
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of children over age ten; Medicis Pharmaceutical promoted this 
drug for diaper rash, and paid $9.8 million to settle a 
whistleblower-brought federal action that brought this 
overpromotion to light.306 
Selling epilepsy medication to treat more than epilepsy. About 
three and a half million people in the United States are currently 
treated for epilepsy,307 and this level of therapeutic attention is 
apparently lower than the pharmaceutical sector wants. We may 
infer as much from how hard manufacturers have worked to 
convince physicians to prescribe drugs to treat other conditions 
after the FDA had approved these drugs only for the treatment of 
epilepsy.308 And here when I say “how hard manufacturers have 
worked,” by “how hard” I mean “how unlawfully.” Penalties for 
this misconduct have been steep. The most notorious 
overpromotion in the epilepsy category involved Neurontin, which 
Parke-Davis marketed to treat bipolar disorder, migraines, and 
non-epilepsy seizures, among other disorders.309 This 
manufacturer paid more than $430 million to settle civil and 
criminal charges.310 
                                                                                                     
doctors to induce them to prescribe Celexa and another antidepressant, 
Lexapro.”). 
 306.  See Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Medicis 
Pharmaceutical to Pay U.S. $9.8 Million to Resolve False Claims Allegations 
(May 8, 2007), https://perma.cc/T8G3-4SHB (last visited Oct. 5, 2019) 
(“Loprox . . . is not a ‘medically accepted indication’ for the treatment of diaper 
dermatitis and other skin disorders in children under 10.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 307.  More Americans Have Epilepsy than Ever Before, CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL (Aug. 10, 2017, 1:00 PM), https://perma.cc/J628-YMB7 (last visited 
Oct. 27, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 308.  See Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Warner-Lambert to Pay $430 Million to Resolve Criminal & Civil Health Care 
Liability Relating to Off-label Promotion (May 13, 2004), 
https://perma.cc/R8KJLFUJ (last visited Oct. 5, 2019) (“The drug Neurontin was 
approved by the Food and Drug Administration in December 1993 solely for 
adjunctive or supplemental anti-seizure use by epilepsy patients.”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 309.  See id. (confirming that Neurontin was marketed to treat eight 
different disorders that had not been approved by the FDA, including the 
degenerative nerve disease ALS, restless leg syndrome, and attention deficit 
disorder). 
 310.  Id. 
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When the Department of Justice (DoJ) announced what it 
called the “largest health care fraud settlement in history,”311 
overpromotion of an epilepsy drug was included in the fraudulent 
conduct so sanctioned.312 Pfizer, Inc. marketed Lyrica, which the 
announcement described as “an anti-epileptic drug,” to treat 
other conditions.313 This epilepsy penalty was attached to a 
separate “criminal fine of $1.195 billion, the largest criminal fine 
ever imposed in the United States for any matter,”314 said DoJ, 
for misconduct amenable to being classified with the first 
grouping of this list, FDA-vetoed assertions: “Pfizer promoted the 
sale of Bextra for several uses and dosages that the FDA 
specifically declined to approve due to safety concerns.”315 
Another manufacturer peddled its epilepsy-only approved product 
as a treatment of “anxiety, insomnia and pain.”316 Other epilepsy 
drugs have joined the roster of overpromotion settlements.317 
                                                                                                     
 311.  See Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice 
Department Announces Largest Health Care Fraud Settlement in Its History 
(Sept. 2, 2009), https://perma.cc/JG8N-KXJ4 (last updated Sept. 15, 2014) (last 
visited Oct. 9, 2019) (reporting that Pfizer agreed to pay $2.3 billion for the 
fraudulent marketing)  (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). This 
dollar record went on to be broken. See infra note 318 (discussing the $1.415 
billion Zyprexa settlement). 
 312.  See id.  
 313.  Id.  
 314.  Id. 
 315.  Id. 
 316.  See Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Biopharmaceutical Company, Cephalon, to Pay $425 Million & Enter Plea to 
Resolve Allegations of Off-label Marketing (Sept. 29, 2008), 
https://perma.cc/5CXR-KJB5 (last visited Oct. 9, 2019) (summarizing settlement 
of charges for Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act violations related to drug Gabitril) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 317.  See, e.g., Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Two 
Johnson & Johnson Subsidiaries to Pay over $81 Million to Resolve Allegations 
of Off-label Promotion of Topamax (Apr. 29, 2010), https://perma.cc/3E6V-AK9U 
(last updated Sept. 15, 2014) (last visited Oct. 9, 2019) (involving the Topamax 
overpromotion settlement) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 
Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Novartis 
Pharmaceuticals Corp. to Pay More than $420 Million to Resolve Off-label 
Promotion and Kickback Allegations (Sept. 30, 2010), 
https://perma.cc/36B3LQYU (last updated Sept. 15, 2014) (last visited Oct. 9, 
2019) (involving the Trileptal overpromotion settlement) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, Pharmaceutical Companies to Pay $214.5 Million to Resolve 
Allegations of Off-label Promotion of Zonegran (Dec. 15, 2010), 
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Selling psychiatric drugs to treat more than the psychiatric 
conditions for which manufacturers had FDA approval. As a 
penalty reminiscent of the billion-plus that Pfizer had to suffer 
for its overpromotion of Bextra, Eli Lilly paid $1.415 billion for its 
off-label promotion of Zyprexa, a drug that the FDA had approved 
first for bipolar disorder and later schizophrenia.318 Apparently 
unsatisfied with this limited marketing opportunity, Lilly decided 
unilaterally—and unlawfully—to pitch Zyprexa to nursing homes 
and assisted-living facilities as a treatment of “dementia, 
Alzheimer’s dementia, depression, anxiety, and sleep problems, 
and behavioral symptoms such as agitation, aggression, and 
hostility.”319 This sum was topped by a $3 billion array of 
penalties imposed on GlaxoSmithKline for misconduct pertaining 
mostly, but not entirely, to the psychotropic drugs Paxil and 
Wellbutrin.320 
                                                                                                     
https://perma.cc/N2GU-YRT3 (last updated Sept. 15, 2014) (last visited Oct. 9, 
2019) (involving the Zonegran overpromotion settlement) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Subsidiary of Belgian Pharmaceutical Manufacturer 
Pleads Guilty to Off-label Promotion; Company to Pay More than $34 Million 
(June 9, 2011), https://perma.cc/5MBP-XS86 (last updated Oct. 22, 2014) (last 
visited Oct. 9, 2019) (involving the Keppra overpromotion settlement) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Press Release, Office of Pub. 
Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Abbott Labs to Pay $1.5 Billion to Resolve 
Criminal & Civil Investigations of Off-label Promotion of Depakote (May 7, 
2012), https://perma.cc/WTE9-GJBL (last updated Oct. 22, 2014) (last visited 
Oct. 9, 2019) (involving the Depakote overpromotion settlement) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, GlaxoSmithKline to Plead Guilty and Pay $3 Billion to Resolve 
Fraud Allegations and Failure to Report Safety Data (July 2, 2012), 
https://perma.cc/T2N5-BJ5P (last updated May 22, 2015) (last visited Oct. 9, 
2019) [hereainafter GlaxoSmithKline] (involving the Lamictal overpromotion 
settlement) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 318.  Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Eli Lilly and 
Company Agrees to Pay $1.415 Billion to Resolve Allegations of Off-Label 
Promotion of Zyprexa (Jan. 15, 2009), https://perma.cc/ZV62-WJCP (last 
updated Oct. 22, 2014) (last visited Feb. 11, 2020). 
 319.  Id. 
 320.  See GlaxoSmithKline, supra note 317 (characterizing the multi-billion 
dollar settlement as “unprecedented in both size and scope” and underscoring 
the Attorney General’s “firm commitment to protecting the American people and 
holding accountable those who commit health care fraud”). 
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Our quick tour through overpromotion has looked at just a 
fraction of the twenty-first century total. A page titled “List of 
off-label promotion pharmaceutical settlements” on Wikipedia 
starts with the $430 million Neurontin settlement in 2004 and 
(as of late 2019) continues with another 38 actions, all brought 
under the False Claims Act.321 No other industry has its own 
wiki-list of False Claims Act episodes, and the roster includes the 
biggest and most famous drug manufacturers.322 One Big Pharma 
name conspicuous by its absence from this overpromotion 
settlements compendium, the Swiss giant Roche, is very much 
present in false-statement personal injury case law under a 
predecessor corporate identity: In 2000 the Nebraska Supreme 
Court ruled that its marketing of Accutane, which “misled the 
medical community with incomplete and inaccurate information 
regarding the safety of the drug,” supported a cause of action for 
fraudulent misrepresentation.323 
Drug companies commonly overpromote their products, in 
short. The “over-” prefix of the word implies deviation, but 
overpromotion is so frequent as to be close to the norm. 
Regulators declare “You may say only X about your product,” and 
the sector — well aware that crossing this line violates the law 
and has generated significant-looking penalties for dozens of 
pharmaceutical companies—routinely says X and Y and Z.  
As an industry practice, overpromotion shows part of what is 
wrong with the leading blackletter test for drug design defect. 
                                                                                                     
 321. List of Off-label Promotion Pharmaceutical Settlements, WIKIPEDIA, 
https://perma.cc/9ULR-ZMKR (last updated Sept. 21, 2019) (last visited Nov. 1, 
2019) [hereinafter WIKIPEDIA] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 322.  See Monique Ellis, Who Are the Top 10 Pharmaceutical Companies in 
the World? (2019), PROCLINICAL (Mar. 20, 2019), https://perma.cc/U6B6-YKF3 
(last visited Oct. 10, 2019) (listing the ten pharmaceutical companies with the 
highest revenues world-wide) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); Top 50 Global Pharmaceutical Companies by Prescription Sales and 
R&D Spending in 2018 (in Billion U.S. Dollars), STATISTA, 
https://perma.cc/GT85-A2GG (last visited Oct. 16, 2019) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 323.  Freeman v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 618 N.W.2d 827, 844–45 (Neb. 
2000). This decision, which reports a rare success in the annals of 
prescription-drug products liability, is used in a torts casebook to illustrate 
pharmaceutical liability generally. JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG ET AL., TORT LAW: 
RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS 971–82 (4th ed. 2016).  
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Recall that the Third Restatement says that a prescription drug 
is defectively designed only if “reasonable health-care providers, 
knowing of such foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits, would 
not prescribe the drug or medical device for any class of 
patients.”324 This test looks out for the health of a small and 
vulnerable cohort.325 If a drug is the treatment of choice for even 
a tiny number of patients—the class has no minimum size, 
suggesting that one person would suffice—then its design is good 
enough, says the Restatement, and the drug deserves to remain 
in the marketplace of treatments.326  
But the pharmaceutical sector emphatically does not want to 
live with a tiny market. Like every other maker of a product 
offered in commerce, it is in the business of selling units—and not 
just selling, of course, but selling more. Unlike manufacturers of 
other products, many of which items are relatively cheap and 
easy to bring to market, drug manufacturers have to spend 
millions of dollars and wait patiently through rounds of trials 
before they can pursue customers for a new commodity.327 Any 
such business will want to hustle as thoroughly as it can to gain 
returns on its investment; being told by a regulator that it may 
say only X about this commodity rather than X and Y and Z will 
chafe. Overpromotion may not be quite baked into its marketing 
plan, but bigger promises will appear attractive for any drug 
whose FDA-approved recommendations do not reach enough 
customers to slake the thirst of its seller. 
                                                                                                     
 324.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(c) (AM. LAW 
INST. 1998). 
 325.  See Cupp, supra note 128, at 96–97 (stating that the Third Restatement 
allows design liability “only in the few cases in which the prescription product is 
so lacking in utility and so steeped in risk that a reasonable medical provider 
would not prescribe it to any class of patients”).  
 326.  See id. (affirming the highly limited nature of product design liability 
for prescription drugs).  
 327.  See Ellis, supra note 322 (“Being a research-driven industry, 
approximately $150 billion is spent by pharmaceutical companies every year on 
research and development projects. Out of thousands of compounds, only a small 
percentage gain regulatory approval to be used by patients to treat 
disease . . . .”).  
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C. A Rhetorical Question: Who Is a Judge or Juror or Litigator to 
Disapprove of a Product After Independent Expert Authority Has 
Said It Is Both Safe and Effective? 
Here we return to a topic addressed earlier under the rubric 
of preemption and can be brief. Whereas most products travel 
directly from design and manufacture to placement in the stream 
of commerce without premarketing review by the government, 
experts at the Food and Drug Administration examine the design 
of this product and must approve it before it can reach 
customers.328 Congress has charged the FDA with an obligation 
to satisfy itself that a new product of this category is both safe 
and effective before customers may buy it,329 and FDA regulation 
of this product continues after its launch on the market.  
Litigants who complain about a prescription drug thus 
challenge an informed judgment that its design and 
accompanying verbiage were good enough to pass analysis that 
resembles the risk-utility test for the design defect. By deeming 
the drug safe enough to be lawfully sold, the FDA made a 
favorable judgment about its risk level and deeming it effective 
implies a favorable judgment about its utility.330 Defenders of 
near-immunity can contend plausibly that persons in the United 
States who consume prescription drugs have already enjoyed 
significant protection from the risk of defectiveness. 
Nevertheless, condoning of a drug by the FDA does not suffice to 
show that no defect is present.  
The Reporters who drafted a nearly immunizing rule 
conceded in a comment to their rule that “unqualified deference” 
to this agency would be unwise,331 and in their scholarly writing 
                                                                                                     
 328.  21 U.S.C. § 355 (2018).  
 329.  See id. § 355(d) (requiring that test results confirm the drug is “safe for 
use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the proposed 
labeling thereof” before FDA approval can be granted). 
 330.  See James A. Henderson Jr., Prescription Drug Design Liability Under 
the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts: A Reporter’s Perspective, 48 RUTGERS 
L. REV. 471, 481 (1998) (“[S]ubstantial deference to a marketplace for 
prescription drugs that appears to function almost perfectly [due to FDA 
regulation] is warranted.”). 
 331.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(c) cmt. b 
(AM. LAW INST. 1998) (acknowledging that a “growing number of courts” consider 
this deference unjustified).  
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they have hewed to this position.332 Indeed, they came to put it in 
sharper terms. Whereas in the Restatement they wrote simply 
that “the FDA occasionally makes mistakes,”333 by 2015 they 
worried that “the FDA relies almost exclusively on data 
developed by private drug manufacturers.”334 Agency decisions to 
approve new drug applications “are thus vulnerable, to an extent 
that judicial decisions are not, to being influenced by 
understatements and misstatements of the relevant risks.”335  
Congress enlarged FDA vulnerability to manufacturer 
influence in late 2016 by passing the 21st Century Cures Act,336 a 
statute that relaxed standards for approval of new 
pharmaceutical drugs and devices.337 This legislation wrote 
exceptions to the familiar demand that the drug manifest safety 
and effectiveness through randomized clinical trials: instead, for 
some applications “real world evidence”—which can include 
insurance records and loosely gathered observational  
studies—will suffice for FDA approval.338 It furnished a shortcut 
to approval by dropping a requirement that the FDA analyze 
                                                                                                     
 332.  See Dan Farber, Preemption and Prescription Drugs, LEGAL PLANET 
(Jan. 6, 2012), https://perma.cc/2MF9-5ZK5 (last visited Oct. 12, 2019) (arguing 
that blindly trusting the FDA’s opinion on the safety and effectiveness of a drug 
is becoming less plausible and suggesting that state tort law simply balances 
the risks and benefits differently, rather than second guessing the FDA’s 
scientific judgment) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 333.  See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 114, at 162–63 (arguing that 
section 6(c) of the Restatement realizes the FDA may occasionally “approv[e] 
worthless drugs that no competent provider would prescribe”). 
 334.  Henderson & Twerski, supra note 114, at 538. 
 335.  Id.  
 336.  21st Century Cures Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 3093(f)(1), 130 
Stat. 1033. 
 337.  See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 360ff-1 (2018) (stating the purpose of this section 
of the Cures Act: “to facilitate the development, review, and approval of 
genetically targeted drugs . . . to address unmet medical need in one or more 
patient subgroups . . . .”).   
 338.  See Trudy Lieberman, With Media Watchdogs on the Sidelines, 
Pharma-Funded Advocacy Groups Pushed Cures Act to the Finish Line, HEALTH 
NEWS REV. (Dec. 6, 2016), https://perma.cc/8EQX-UFH5 (last visited Oct. 12, 
2019) (“[The 21st Century Cures Act] loosen[s] regulation over drug and device 
makers, reduce[s] the number of clinical trials needed to approve a drug, and 
permit[s] advertising for off-label drug uses, all of which would help drug and 
device makers expand their markets.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review).  
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study results independently, permitting manufacturers to submit 
data summaries instead.339 Medical devices have long been held 
to a more lenient standard for approval than the one for drugs;340 
the 21st Century Cures Act expanded this lenity by recognizing 
“combination products” that contain both drugs and devices and 
blesses them with the lower standard used for devices.341 An 
analyst quoted in the New York Times soon after this legislation 
passed called it “a holiday win” for health-sector businesses and 
investors.342  
Twenty-seven years ago, a separate piece of federal 
legislation took effect to similar effect: The Prescription Drug 
User Fee Act343 compels the FDA to charge pharmaceutical 
manufacturers for reviewing new drug applications.344 The 
consumer activist group Public Citizen, contending that this 
enactment makes the FDA in effect a customer of the sector it 
regulates, has followed post-1993 approved drugs and in 2011 
reported that the FDA had withdrawn twenty of them.345 
Continuing reauthorization of this statute has meant that 
manufacturers finance agency review of the applications they 
submit.346 As of 2020 the FDA is charging a flat fee of $2,942,965 
                                                                                                     
 339.  See id. (“New drugs could be approved on the basis of data summaries 
rather than requiring the FDA to independently analyze study results for a new 
drug indication.”).  
 340.  See generally RICHARD A. MERRILL, REGULATION OF DRUGS & DEVICES: 
AN EVOLUTION (1994), https://perma.cc/2JG9-5BPR (PDF) (explaining that 
Congress sought to create a more relaxed framework for medical devices in 
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per application that needs clinical data, half that for an 
application that needs no clinical data, plus a $325,424 “program 
fee” for most applications.347 Manufacturers, especially ones that 
pay for numerous reviews, have reason to think that the FDA is 
working for them. 
Sharing henhouse-oversight power with foxes has generated 
injuries that go beyond the approval of dangerous drugs. 
Researchers at John Hopkins University learned in 2018 that 
when the FDA decided to expand its authorization of fentanyl 
treatments to benefit a larger class of patients, it turned over 
management of the distribution to a private entity that worked 
with manufacturers.348 Whereas the FDA had permitted 
furnishing these fentanyl products only to patients with cancer 
and demonstrated high tolerance for opioids,349 this intermediary 
gave it out liberally to patients with other complaints.350 Some of 
them died.351 The program enriched manufacturers with 
prescriptions billed at more than $30,000 each for a month’s 
supply.352 
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 350.  See id. (reporting that one patient was prescribed fentanyl for “chronic 
back pain from two car accidents and a fibromyalgia diagnosis” while another 
suffered from a degenerative spinal disease).  
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D. The Belief That Tort Liability Lamentably Thwarts the Sector’s 
Significant Contributions to Public Health 
Unlike the last section, this concluding discussion for the 
Part will not be brief; the belief examined here is the 
furthest-reaching of the four and warrants the deepest dive. To 
condemn a drug design or warning in court is to say that every 
unit is defective now,353 with every user positioned to seek 
redress that in the aggregate can be powerful enough to drive a 
product from the market.354 A prescription drug might be 
sufficiently profitable for sellers to laugh off the price of tort 
liability, but not all are.355 Tort, when costly enough, can send 
valuable products into oblivion, lost to patients forever.356  
Consider collective and social impacts. Prescription drugs are 
routinely chosen for other people, including children, hospital 
patients, and adult consumers who do not participate actively in 
their health decisions.357 In this way they are useful to 
bystanders and third-party purchasers, not only the people who 
pay for them or ingest them. Beyond this decision-making circle, 
some prescription drugs improve public health.358 Medications 
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and preventatives for transmittable diseases heal both 
individuals and the body politic.359 The value of a drug extends 
beyond what it does for its buyers. 
These truths about prescription drugs form a pillar that 
ascribes benevolence to the industry.360 Differing from other 
consumer-product manufacturers that make 
take-‘em-or-leave-‘em items—to support transportation, 
manufacture, hobbies, aesthetics, household tasks, 
entertainment, and so on—this sector makes commodities 
necessary for health.361 Partnered almost synonymously with 
wealth, its rhyme, health is a central constituent of public 
welfare.362 “Leave the sector alone,” says this pillar to tort 
liability, except in the unusual circumstance where forcing it to 
pay damages is desirable. It keeps us alive and well. 
How merited is this shelter from liability? Putting aside the 
special case of vaccines, a unique drug category outside the scope 
of this Article that probably did warrant its 1986 rescue from the 
reach of tort,363 it is impossible to know whether any prescription 
drug that increases health needed the boost of exceptionally 
favorable products liability doctrine to reach the public. We do, 
however, have reason to conclude that many offerings from this 
sector have brought relatively little to the array of 
health-generating treatments on the market.364 The industry 
engages in useful activity, to be sure. But it does much more than 
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make people better off. One of its notoriously bad products has 
made the public worse off. 
1. MeToo Drugs and Other Dubious Intellectual Property 
According to this pillar supporting near-total products 
liability immunity, a kindly industry needs extra tolerance so 
that it can invent and sell its health-giving new ideas. The large 
majority of ostensibly new drugs in the United States “are not 
new at all,” observed Marcia Angell, longtime editor-in-chief of 
the New England Journal of Medicine; Angell called them 
“merely variations of older drugs already on the market.”365 
Innovation occurs, but the sector gains new patents and profits 
without creating anything fresh.366 “If I’m a manufacturer and I 
can change one molecule and get another twenty years of patent 
rights,” said Sharon Levine, an expert interviewed on a television 
special, “and convince physicians to prescribe and consumers to 
demand the next form of Prilosec, or weekly Prozac instead of 
daily Prozac, just as my patent expires, then why would I be 
spending money on a lot less certain endeavor, which is looking 
for brand-new drugs?”367  
The gallery of MeToo consists mostly of trivial novel 
innovations, but some add even less to public well-being. The 
notorious OxyContin should never have been granted a patent, 
argues a Harvard-based team of three scholars credentialed in 
law, medicine, and public health.368 We encountered OxyContin 
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earlier in this article and it will soon return.369 Here it serves as 
an example of dubious intellectual property.370 Years before it 
came up with OxyContin, its manufacturer Purdue Pharma had 
developed a technology known as Contin whose function is to 
control the release of a drug from a tablet.371 Purdue applied 
Contin to the un-patentable morphine to form MS Contin, and 
MS Contin became its top-selling drug.372  The idea behind 
OxyContin was to apply Contin to the similar-to-morphine 
oxycodone; “the combination of Contin and oxycodone would have 
been obvious to any pharmaceutical chemist.”373  
The United States Patent and Trademark Office duly 
rejected Purdue’s patent application as obvious, but the company 
found a slight and obscure difference between extended-release 
oxycodone and other extended-release opioid analgesics and won 
its patent.374 Purdue continued its aggressive deployment of 
intellectual property by patenting an abuse-deterrent version of 
OxyContin, ceasing to manufacture its original formulation to 
force customers into the new design, and pressing the FDA 
successfully to forbid generic versions of the original OxyContin, 
ostensibly on safety grounds.375 Manufacturers of generic 
OxyContin eventually succeeded in challenging the secondary 
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(ALMOST) NO BAD DRUGS 73 
patents, but Purdue won precious time to set up elaborate 
promotion.376 
Lack of innovation in the sector, a condition long lamented by 
investors who buy stock in pharmaceutical companies,377 is 
ironically highlighted by innovation that this community of critics 
has created: Investment prospects are so bleak that the 
much-derided tool of a derivative makes sense as a policy fix.378 
According to one scholarly proposal presented as reparative 
rather than gimmicky, derivatives markets could offer a long 
position that a drug innovation will fail and a short position that 
it will capture significant market share.379 Meanwhile, investors 
remain frustrated by the sector’s apparent inability to formulate 
what to them appears a simple innovation, new antibiotics in 
response to antibiotic resistance,380 and a major financial services 
advisor has reported a negative feedback loop where drug 
companies lower their spending on research and development 
because they lack confidence that this investment will pay off, a 
decision that reduces their innovation.381 
Investors’ disappointing portfolio returns may be of limited 
interest to the rest of us, but all persons have a stake in the 
welfare that innovative drugs deliver and that most new drugs 
lack.382 When innovation is absent in a new drug, the public not 
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only fails to benefit but can also suffer. Jerry Avorn, a physician 
and pharmacologist, has drafted a bit of boilerplate that deserves 
to be slapped on many drug labels: “This new medication has not 
been shown to be better than currently available products, and 
has a much more limited safety record. There is no evidence that 
its higher price is accompanied by any demonstrated therapeutic 
advantage.”383 
2. Industry-generated Lowering of Thresholds for Chronic 
Conditions 
Pharmaceutical manufacturers have come up with an idea of 
how to increase sales when they lack an idea. Chronic diseases 
make money for the sector because patients live long enough to 
keep buying but do not get well enough to walk away from their 
prescription. Patent rents as a reward, writes the intellectual 
property scholar Samuel Murumba, encourage manufacturers to 
invest their research energies in this type of pathology rather 
than in vaccines or cures, “both of which wipe out the disease and 
thus destroy the goose guaranteed to lay the golden egg.”384  
In this setting, one way to make more new money selling 
prescription drugs without innovation in design is to enlarge this 
market, whose customers—all of them relatively unlikely to have 
their diagnosis undone—take daily doses.385 According to a 2012 
review, sixity percent of the medications most often prescribed in 
the United States are for three such chronic conditions: 
hypertension or high blood pressure, hyperlipidemia or high 
cholesterol, and diabetes.386 All three are diagnosed with 
reference to numerical cutoffs.387 This much systolic and diastolic 
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pressure as measured in numbered units, or this many 
milligrams of cholesterol or glucose, take a patient over the 
disease threshold.388 
Quantitative minimums to qualify for all three diagnoses 
have been reduced in the last couple of decades.389 Fasting 
glucose of 126 now marks the transition to diabetes in contrast to 
the 1992 cutoff, which had been 140.390 The year 1992 lacked a 
disease of today called “prediabetes,” a condition that these days 
receives pharmaceutical treatment.391 For patients without 
diabetes, blood pressure can go as high as 160/95 without 
reaching a diagnostic threshold; today the nondiabetic cutoff is 
140/90, and for persons with diabetes, 130/80.392 “Pre-diabetes,” a 
label that arrives when patients score a fasting plasma glucose of 
100–125 milligrams per deciliter,393 should be treated with 
lifestyle modifications, not medication, said the American 
Diabetes Association in 2003;394 five years later, the organization 
switched to an official endorsement of drug therapy.395 
High-cholesterol diagnostic thresholds dropped from 280 
milligrams per deciliter to 240, with a de facto minimum of 200 
now guiding many physicians’ decisions to prescribe a statin 
pill.396 
Ostensibly independent expert panels write the decisions to 
define diagnostic criteria, but the pharmaceutical sector has left 
visible fingerprints on lowered minimums. After a National 
Institutes of Health panel recommended dropping the threshold 
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for hyperlipidemia and had its recommendation accepted, the 
former editor in chief of the New England Journal of Medicine 
pointed out that “most panel members who helped write the 
recommendations”—two out of nine—“had financial ties to the 
pharmaceutical companies that stood to gain enormously from 
increased use of statins.”397 Nine out of eleven physician panelists 
who in 2003 joined an official recommendation to lower the 
criteria for high blood pressure had similar ties to drug 
companies in the form of research funding, stock ownership, or 
payments for consulting work.398 
 The drug sector benefits from lowered thresholds other than 
those that increase sales of chronic-condition medications. In a 
memoir about her life in the weight classification of “super 
morbidly obese,” Roxane Gay observes that the National Heart, 
Lung, and Blood Institute decided to reduce the body-mass index 
number that declares weight to be normal to 25, “thereby 
doubling the number of obese Americans.”399 A stated reason for 
this choice: “A round number like 25 would be easy for people to 
remember.”400 No drug-business influence like research funding 
or consulting income here, but a similar stake for rent seeking: 
Obesity is lucrative because vendors sell not only prescription 
drugs but prepared foods, dietary supplements, gym 
memberships and exercise regimens, books with orders about 
what to eat and not eat, and other commodities pointed at weight 
loss.401 The most effective treatment for obesity, bariatric 
surgery, is so costly that according to a study published in the 
Journal of the American Medical Association, this intervention 
“does not reduce overall health care costs in the long term,”402 
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even though researchers have estimated the cost of obesity itself 
as more than $209.7 billion in health care expenses alone, not 
counting other consequences like job absenteeism.403 The more 
people are taken out of the leave-them-alone “normal” weight 
category, the more customers emerge.404 
Lowered minimums for established diseases is a mundane 
way for an idea-free manufacturer to make money; Eli Lilly did 
much better by recasting its old drug as the cure for a new 
disease.405 Just when Prozac, the brand name for fluoxetine 
hydrochloride, was about to go off patent, its manufacturer won 
FDA approval to rebrand this active ingredient as Sarafem.406 
Sarafem contains the exact same fluoxetine hydrochloride as in 
Prozac and patients consume it in the same dose—twenty 
milligrams a day407—but it travels to a different therapeutic 
goal.408 Instead of depression, Sarafem addresses premenstrual 
dysphoric disorder (“PMDD”), a label that the FDA started to 
recognize as a mental disorder in 1998,409 following a Lilly-funded 
meeting of four FDA officials with six Lilly executives.410  
                                                                                                     
Bariatric Surgery, 310 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 742, 742 (2013). 
 403.  See John Cawley & Chad Meyerhoefer, The Medical Care Costs of 
Obesity: An Instrumental Variables Approach, 31 J. HEALTH ECON. 219, 227 
(2012). 
 404.  See GAY, supra note 399, at 11–12 (attributing the increased number of 
Americans now considered obese to the shift in the BMI calculation structure). 
 405.  See Alicia Rebensdorf, The Pimping of Prozac for PMS, ALTERNET (June 
12, 2001), https://perma.cc/T8DY-54HX (last visited Oct. 15, 2019) (“[It] has to 
do with money, with commerce, with, basically, sly marketing.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 406.  See id. (discussing the history of Sarafem as the successor of Prozac).  
 407.  See id. (“Sarafem/Prozac both require 20 mg. doses . . . . You don’t take 
Sarafem any less often. You don’t take it [in] any smaller doses.”). 
 408.  See id. (“The company . . . turned the depression-stigmatized label 
Prozac to the oh-so-feminine name Sarafem” to treat PMDD). 
 409.  See JAMES DAVIES, CRACKED: THE UNHAPPY TRUTH ABOUT PSYCHIATRY 76 
(2013) (recalling the history of premenstrual dysphoric disorder). 
 410.  See John Fauber et al., For One Condition, the Drugs Came Before the 
Disorder, MILWAUKEE J.-SENTINEL (Nov. 15, 2016, 11:02 PM), 
https://perma.cc/SU5M-MCPC (last updated Jan. 7, 2016, 3:43 PM) (last visited 
Oct. 29, 2019) (explaining that the meeting led the FDA and drug executives to 
conclude, on their own, that premenstrual dysphoric disorder was a clinical 
disorder necessitating selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors as treatment) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
78 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2020) 
The American Psychiatric Association did not recognize 
PMDD as a distinct psychiatric condition until 2013—“a 
determination that was based on the recommendation of a panel 
on which nearly 70% of the members had drug company ties.”411 
Lilly rolled out Sarafem in pink instead of Prozac’s green.412 No 
accident: Drug designers know better than to make 
erectile-dysfunction pills in pink, writes the psychotherapist 
James Davies, or “a menstruation pill that is dark red.”413  
3. Which Drug Stands in for the Sector’s Products? 
When William Prosser named only one pharmaceutical 
product in comment k to his Section 402A of the Second 
Restatement, the drug he chose was the heroically formed 
Pasteur rabies vaccine.414 The item is so excellent that even 
though it cannot be safe, Prosser suggested, it is never 
unreasonably dangerous.415  
Louis Pasteur moved to rabies in 1885 after working on other 
important applications of microbiology.416 He gave the vaccine he 
had synthesized to a nine-year-old boy who had been bitten 
severely by feral dogs.417 Pasteur had done nothing resembling 
safety tests of his invention, but without an experimental 
treatment young Joseph Meister was headed for a swift death.418 
About a century and a half later, rabies still has no cure; it 
remains a fatal, painful disease that medicine cannot even 
alleviate, let alone reverse.419 Prevention in the form of 
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vaccination is the hope for persons vulnerable to rabies following 
a traumatic impact like an animal bite.420 And so Prosser spoke 
for a consensus when he wrote in comment k that terrible side 
effects do not make this product defective, unreasonably 
designed, or in any way deserving of condemnation in court.421  
This noble substance embodies therapeutic drugs at their 
best. It saves lives when all alternatives would fail.422 Its 
inventor created it out of wholly benevolent motives.423 To the 
extent it does harm, its harm is necessary. Prosser coined the 
phrase “unavoidably unsafe” to describe an urgent need that can 
be met nowhere else.424  
Full props to Pasteur and his vaccine, but one drug—a 
substance invented in France back when Grover Cleveland was 
president of the United States and that has been superseded in 
current rabies therapy425—cannot stand in for the entire output 
of the sector. Any equating of prescription drugs with gains to 
social welfare à la comment k has to reckon with what this entire 
category of product does, rather than confine itself to one 
triumph. A counterpoint to the sole useful item for one painful 
and fatal disease, I suggest, is a drug at the other end of the 
utility-and-benevolence spectrum.  
Here are a few numbers about what routinely—and 
accurately—gets called an epidemic. In 2018, a nonprofit health 
research institute announced its estimate of the cost of a crisis in 
the United States from 2001 to 2017: more than a trillion 
                                                                                                     
(noting that rabies still does not have a cure). 
 420.  See id. at 280 (explaining that rabies can be prevented through the 
administration of a vaccine after exposure to the virus). 
 421.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (AM. LAW. INST. 
1965) (“Since the disease invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the 
marketing and the use of the vaccine are fully justified . . . .”). 
 422. See Zhu & Gho, supra note 419, at 279 (stating that vaccination “is the 
only approved, effective method for post-exposure prophylaxis against rabies in 
humans”). 
 423.  But see generally GEISON, supra note 416 (criticizing Pasteur for 
shortcomings of ethics and research methods). 
 424.  See id. (recognizing that vaccines have a high level of inherent, 
unavoidable risk). 
 425.  See Zhu & Gho, supra note 419, at 280 (discussing the development of 
live-attenuated virus-based rabies vaccines, which emerged long after the 
Pasteur invention and are safer and more effective for post-exposure 
prophylaxis). 
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dollars.426 An estimated two to four million persons in the United 
States suffered from opioid disorders in 2016,427 and 72,000 
persons died of drug overdoses (not all from opioids and some of 
them from mixes of opioids and other drugs) in 2017, a record 
number.428 “According to the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, nearly half of all opioid overdose deaths involve a 
prescription opioid,”429 writes a student commentator, “and in 
2013, providers wrote nearly 250,000,000 opioid  
prescriptions—enough for every adult in the United States to 
have his ‘own bottle of pills.’”430 Recent years marked an 
extraordinary reduction in life expectancy in the United States,431 
a development that experts have attributed to increased 
opioid-overdose deaths.432 The catastrophe at issue here ranks 
among the worst public health disasters in American history.433 
                                                                                                     
 426.  See Economic Toll of Opioid Crisis in U.S. Exceeded $1 Trillion Since 
2001, ALTARUM (Feb. 13, 2018), https://perma.cc/249N-UEXL (last visited Oct. 
16, 2019) [hereinafter ALTARUM] (discussing the cost of the opioid epidemic as 
inclusive of lost wages, lost productivity, lost tax revenue, health care costs, and 
additional spending across different sectors) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 427.  Margot Sanger-Katz, Bleak New Estimates in Drug Epidemic: A Record 
72,000 Overdose Deaths in 2017, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/X5HA-WM6E (last visited Oct. 16, 2019) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 428.  See id. (finding that drug overdose deaths reached a record high due to 
higher levels of opioid use and deadlier drug combinations). 
 429.  Alyssa M. McClure, Note, Illegitimate Overprescription: How Burrage v. 
United States Is Hindering Punishment of Physicians and Bolsters the Opioid 
Epidemic, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1747, 1750–51 (2018) (citations omitted). 
 430. Id. 
 431.  See Grace Donnelly, Here’s Why Life Expectancy in the U.S. Dropped 
Again This Year, FORTUNE (Feb. 9, 2018), https://perma.cc/7M67-UJUJ (last 
visited Nov. 22, 2019) (reporting that the new average life expectancy for 
Americans is 78.7 years, “which puts the U.S. behind other developed nations[,]” 
including “Canada, Germany, Mexico, France, Japan, and the U.K.”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 432. See id. (finding that the reduction in life expectancy is partially due to 
drug overdoses). 
 433.  See BETH MACY, DOPESICK: DEALERS, DOCTORS, AND THE DRUG COMPANY 
THAT ADDICTED AMERICA 9 (2018) (deeming the opioid crisis the “worst drug 
epidemic in American history”); see also Neil Howe, America’s Opioid Crisis: A 
Nation Hooked, FORBES (Nov. 30, 2017, 1:42 PM), https://perma.cc/3MRW-8KPR 
(last visited Oct. 16, 2019) (deeming opioid crisis the “worst public health crisis 
in American history”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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Prescription opioids are at least as worthy as the Pasteur 
rabies vaccine to serve as the industry exemplar in an overview of 
American drug products liability law and policy. They are more 
American in their origin, more recently invented (yet established 
enough to have a track record in health policy and law), more 
visible in contemporary litigation and law enforcement,434 more 
significant within the national economy,435 and much more widely 
consumed.436 Moving as needed between the drug named 
OxyContin in particular and all prescription opioids in general, 
let us consider some contrasts between them and the Pasteur 
vaccine. 
Amenability to dangerous misuse. No user can alter a dose of 
rabies vaccine to make it more dangerous. The only way to 
                                                                                                     
 434.  See Ausness, supra note 7 (reviewing opioid actions filed by 
governments); see also Haffajee & Mello, supra note 7, at 2302–03 (providing a 
summary of opioid litigation around the country); Thomas Sullivan, Opioid 
Class Action Suit Filed in Five States, POL’Y & MED. (last updated May 14, 
2018), https://perma.cc/42D5-BWCG (last visited Oct. 17, 2019) (summarizing 
lawsuits filed against opioid distributors and the subsequent allegations) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 435.  See, e.g., Douglas L. Leslie et al., The Economic Burden of the Opioid 
Epidemic on States: The Case of Medicaid, AM. J. MANAGED CARE (July 30, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/2F2H-8GDC (last visited Dec. 9, 2019) (estimating that the 
overall societal cost of opioid use disorders—including health care, criminal 
justice, and workplace costs—reached $78.5 billion in 2016) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 436.  The significance of this product is suggested by the long list of books 
about it as a crisis published in the last couple of years, a roster not limited to 
CHARLES ATKINS, OPIOID USE DISORDER: A HOLISTIC GUIDE TO ASSESSMENT, 
TREATMENT, AND RECOVERY (2018); NICHOLAS BUSH, ONE BY ONE: A MEMOIR OF 
LOVE AND LOSS IN THE SHADOWS OF OPIOID AMERICA (2018); J.N. CAMPBELL & 
STEVEN ROONEY, A TIME-RELEASE HISTORY OF THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC (2018); BRIAN 
ALLEN CARR, OPIOID, INDIANA (2019); MAUREEN CAVANAGH, IF YOU LOVE ME: A 
MOTHER'S JOURNEY THROUGH HER DAUGHTER'S OPIOID ADDICTION (2020); RYAN 
HAMPTON, AMERICAN FIX: INSIDE THE OPIOID ADDICTION CRISIS—AND HOW TO END 
IT (2018); TIFFANY JENKINS, HIGH ACHIEVER: THE INCREDIBLE TRUE STORY OF ONE 
ADDICT'S DOUBLE LIFE (2019); MACY, supra note 433; MEIER, supra note 7; LIZ 
MOORE, LONG BRIGHT RIVER (2020); HARRY NELSON, THE UNITED STATES OF 
OPIOIDS: A PRESCRIPTION FOR LIBERATING A NATION IN PAIN (2019); YNGVILD 
OLSEN & JOSHUA M. SHARFSTEIN, THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS 
TO KNOW (2019); TRAVIS RIEDER, IN PAIN: A BIOETHICIST’S PERSONAL STRUGGLE 
WITH OPIOIDS (2019); TERENCE G. SCHILLER, OPIOID EPIDEMIC: A NATIONAL PLAN 
TO STOP IT (2018); DANIEL SKINNER & BERKELEY FRANZ, NOT FAR FROM ME: 
STORIES OF OPIOIDS AND OHIO (2019); KIMBERLY SUE, GETTING WRECKED: WOMEN, 
INCARCERATION, AND THE AMERICAN OPIOID CRISIS (2019); EILENE ZIMMERMAN, 
SMACKED: A STORY OF WHITE-COLLAR AMBITION, ADDICTION, AND TRAGEDY (2020). 
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misuse this drug is to administer it to someone who has 
experienced no exposure to rabies. This unfortunate individual 
will suffer harmful side effects and gain no benefit. 
OxyContin as a lab creation differed from rival painkillers 
like Vicodin and Percocet in its longer-acting formulation.437 
Approving it as a new drug in 1995, the FDA permitted the 
manufacturer to claim that the long-acting design “was believed 
to reduce” OxyContin’s appeal to drug abusers.438 No clinical 
evidence backed this claim; the agency was simply willing to 
accept without evidence that shorter-acting design meant a faster 
hit that abusers would value.439 Purdue, its manufacturer, 
“trained sales representative to tell doctors that OxyContin was 
less addictive and prone to abuse than competing opioids, claims 
beyond the one approved by the F.D.A.”440 
Users easily learned that OxyContin contained significantly 
higher narcotic levels than its shorter-acting rivals, and they 
learned how to abuse it.441 The long-acting Purdue opioid called 
MS Contin was written up in a 1996 medical journal as a favorite 
of addicts who had learned how to extract morphine from MS 
Contin and inject it.442 In 1998, Purdue learned about a study 
published in a medical journal that identified MS Contin as 
addicts’ favorite opioid, for the same high-narcotics condition 
found also in OxyContin.443 Purdue did not report what it had 
                                                                                                     
 437.  See Barry Meier, Origins of an Epidemic, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/7C96-L49E (last visited Oct. 16, 2019) (reporting that the FDA 
allowed Purdue Pharma to uniquely claim that OxyContin’s long-acting 
formulation posed less of a threat of abuse than other painkillers) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 438.  Id. 
 439.  See id. (“The [FDA] decision was not based on findings from clinical 
trials, but a theory that drug abusers favored shorter-acting painkillers because 
the narcotic they contained was released faster and so produced a quicker 
‘hit.’”). 
 440.  Id. 
 441.  See id. (explaining that the long-acting Oxycontin could be snorted or 
injected intravenously).  
 442.  See id. (detailing abusers’ process of extracting morphine from MS 
Contin in Australia and New Zealand).   
 443.  See id. (referencing an article from the Journal of the Canadian 
Medical Association reporting that MS Contin sold for $40 per 30-milligram 
tablet on the illegal drug market—the highest price of any prescription opioid). 
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learned to the FDA, and expanded its marketing campaign.444 
The method of dangerous misuse started soon after the 
OxyContin launch in 1996 and continued until 2010.445 
Addicts and abusers learned to crush this pill to obtain full 
delivery of the opioid without the delay installed by its 
time-release feature.446 Crushed (meaning pulverized) OxyContin 
could be snorted, smoked, or dissolved in water and then 
injected.447 In 2010, Purdue reformulated OxyContin to defeat 
this alteration, and today’s OxyContin when pounded turns into a 
gummy gel rather than an easy-to-ingest powder.448 Users have 
passed around trips to defeat gummification of the  
opioid—including baking it, freezing it, and soaking it in a 
variety of solvents—but few of these modifications seem to 
work.449 Frustrated by Purdue’s reformulation, a significant 
number of these users abandoned their crush technique, which 
would have been a positive development if they had moved to 
abstinence from opioids rather than to heroin and other 
narcotics.450  
Overpromotion. Sellers cannot overpromote a rabies vaccine, 
or at least they have never in known history been observed trying 
to overpromote this drug.451 Patients who receive it as a 
                                                                                                     
 444.  See id. (reporting that Purdue instead gave the FDA and its sales 
officials an older survey that contradicted the Canadian study because “the 
company did not consider the small study’s results significant”). 
 445.  See William N. Evans et al., How the Reformulation of OxyContin 
Ignited the Heroin Epidemic, 101 REV. ECON. & STAT. 1, 1 (2019) (arguing that 
Purdue’s reformulation of OxyContin in 2010 made the drug less appealing to 
drug abusers). 
 446.  See Abby Goodnough & Katie Zezima, Drug Is Harder to Abuse, but 
Users Persevere, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 15, 2011), https://perma.cc/U3KH-9PBR (last 
visited Oct. 17, 2019) (stating that pre-2010, users discovered that crushing 
OxyContin tablets “produced an instant high as powerful as heroin”). 
 447.  Id.  
 448.  See id. (noting that the reformulation is intended to deter abuse and 
many patients are frustrated by their inability to crush and inject the drug). 
 449.  Id.  
 450.  See id. (observing that Opana, a time-release painkiller similar to 
Oxycontin, “is showing up increasingly in police reports and has been blamed for 
a rash of overdose deaths”); see also Evans, supra note 445, at 1 (arguing that 
many drug abusers switch to heroin because it offers a cheaper and more 
accessible high than modified OxyContin). 
 451.  See Zhu & Guo, supra note 419, at 280–81 (providing a brief history of 
the rabies vaccine). 
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treatment need it urgently. Externalities of its distribution and 
use exist—that was Prosser’s point when he used it to stand in 
for all prescription drugs—but by hypothesis they are as low as 
possible because only people who must have this substance will 
buy it.452  
Opioids, by contrast, went to patients for whom this drug 
would do harm, and it reached them because manufacturers 
chose an extraordinarily aggressive marketing strategy.453 Opioid 
overpromotion reached its most egregious heights with 
OxyContin. Purdue hosted more than forty pain management 
symposia between 1996 and 2001, paying all expenses for more 
than 5,000 physicians, nurses, and pharmacists to be trained for 
a national speaker bureau.454 Purdue also paid bonuses to its 
detailers to make sales calls to physicians identified in a database 
as the highest prescribers of opioids in the country.455 It handed 
out approximately 34,000 coupons for a free prescription of its 
drug, and an array of branded promotional items for physicians 
that the Drug Enforcement Administration said was 
unprecedented in the history of opioid sales.456 Although Purdue 
directed most of its marketing budget toward prescribers, it also 
promoted OxyContin to the public through a website called 
Partners Against Pain.457 
                                                                                                     
 452.  See id. at 281 (“Unlike most other vaccines . . . rabies vaccines are 
designed to be . . . administered primarily in a post-exposure manner.”). 
 453.  See supra notes 294–295 and accompanying text.  
 454.  Art Van Zee, The Promotion and Marketing of OxyContin: Commercial 
Triumph, Public Health Tragedy, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 221, 221–22 (2009). 
 455.  See id. at 222 (documenting the targeting of specific providers by 
Purdue Pharma salespeople to encourage OxyContin prescriptions). 
 456.  See id. (noting Purdue Pharma’s distribution of coupons for a free 
limited-time prescription for a 7- to -30 day supply of OxyContin); see also U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-110, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: OXYCONTIN 
ABUSE AND DIVERSION AND EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM 25 (2003), 
https://perma.cc/YS8K-2LC4 (PDF) (recognizing that marketing techniques used 
by Purdue Pharma to sell OxyContin were unprecedented among schedule II 
opioids). 
 457.  See Joseph B. Prater, Comment, West Virginia’s Painful Settlement: 
How the OxyContin Phenomenon and Unconventional Theories of Tort Liability 
May Make Pharmaceutical Companies Liable for Black Markets, 100 NW. U.L. 
REV. 1409, 1430 n.172 (2006) (revealing that “Partners Against Pain . . . offered 
information about chronic pain and its treatments to the general public”). 
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The manufacturer of OxyContin paid for other misbehaviors 
that included but were not limited to overpromotion,458 and other 
drug manufacturers also overpromoted opioids.459 Purdue had an 
agreement with the bigger and more established Abbott 
Laboratories to engage in joint promotion of OxyContin, paying 
Abbott a commission on sales.460 Cephalon paid $425 million to 
settle federal charges that it engaged in overpromotion in the 
form of recommending unauthorized off-label uses of its opioid 
Actiq.461 Another manufacturer paid less, just a tenth of the 
Cephalon sum, to settle Justice Department allegations that it 
“paid health care providers to induce them to promote or 
prescribe” Kadian, its opioid.462 In 2019, law enforcement in this 
area escalated when executives of Insys Therapeutics, 
manufacturer of a transmucosal immediate-release fentanyl 
product, were convicted of federal racketeering charges for 
conduct that included bribing physicians to prescribe this 
opioid.463 
Incentives for cohorts to join in socially destructive conduct. 
Just as the rabies vaccine cannot be modified to become more 
                                                                                                     
 458.  See Barry Meier, In Guilty Plea, OxyContin Maker to Pay $600 Million, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2007), https://perma.cc/EM6N-3NQT (last visited Oct. 17, 
2019) (reporting that Purdue Pharma executives pleaded guilty to misbranding 
OxyContin’s true level of addictiveness) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review).  
 459.  See supra notes 298, 317 and accompanying text. 
 460.  See Howland v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 821 N.E.2d 141, 143 (Ohio 2004) 
(mentioning the agreement to share promotion obligations and profits from 
OxyContin net sales). 
 461.  See Evan Hughes, The Pain Hustlers, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (May 2, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/ZN47-LXR6 (last visited Feb. 4, 2020) (pointing out that the 
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Review).  
 462.  Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Alpharma to 
Pay $42.5 Million to Resolve False Claims Act Allegations in Connection with 
Promotion of Drug Kadian (Mar. 16, 2010), https://perma.cc/W44H-WXVG (last 
updated Sept. 15, 2014) (last visited Oct. 17, 2019) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 463.  See Gabrielle Emmanuel & Katie Thomas, Top Executives of Insys, an 
Opioid Company, Are Found Guilty of Racketeering, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/LE97-Z57R (last visited Jan. 7, 2020) (reporting that federal 
authorities also recently filed “felony drug trafficking charges against a major 
pharmaceutical distributor” of opioids and two of its former executives) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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dangerous to a user, it also does not invite other populations into 
deleterious behaviors that a drug manufacturer starts. Opioids 
endangered the public not only through misconduct by their 
manufacturers, but by in effect recruiting constituencies into 
harm.464 Actions by physicians, patients, and drug distributors 
compounded the dangers that manufacturers initiated.465  
Physicians compound the harm of overpromotion when they 
choose to overprescribe this drug.466 This pattern inverts the 
trope of the learned intermediary, which in the law of warning 
defect posits the physician as an intelligent inhibitor of ignorance 
and impulse on the part of patients.467 Examples of opioid 
overpromotion noted in this Article were investments that paid 
off: doctors responded to these marketing initiatives by writing 
scripts.468 Criminal, occupational-regulatory, and tort sanctions 
can befall physicians for wrongs related to drug prescriptions.469 
All these sanctions have been applied to opioid 
over-prescribers,470 but the magnitude of the crisis greatly 
                                                                                                     
 464.  See Van Zee, supra note 454, at 222–23 (reviewing the great lengths to 
which Purdue Pharma went to convince health care providers that OxyContin 
was a safe treatment for chronic, non-cancer-related pain). 
 465.  See id. at 223 (finding that drug distributors’ marketing tactics 
encouraged physicians to prescribe opioids in unprecedented amounts).  
 466.  See id. (documenting high prescribing areas by geography, with Maine, 
West Virginia, eastern Kentucky, southwestern Virginia, and Alabama 
prescribing opioids “5 to 6 times higher than the national average” by the year 
2000). 
 467.  See supra Part IV.B; see also Ben A. Rich & Lynn R. Webster, A Review 
of Forensic Implications of Opioid Prescribing with Examples from Malpractice 
Cases Involving Opioid-related Overdose, 12 PAIN MED. S59, S62 (2011) (noting 
physicians’ professional responsibility regarding the safety and efficacy of 
treatment options).  
 468.  See Van Zee, supra note 454, at 223 (reporting that after Purdue 
started promoting OxyContin for non-cancer pain, prescriptions increased 
almost tenfold, “from about 670,000 in 1997 to about 6.2 million in 2002”). For a 
review of the evidence that overpromotion increases prescribing, see supra note 
294 and accompanying text (discussing the influence of promotional gifts on 
physicians’ prescribing practices). 
 469.  See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2018) (imposing criminal penalties under the 
Controlled Substances Act); see also Rich & Webster, supra note 467, at  
S62–S63 (listing various theories of physician liability, including medical 
malpractice). 
 470.  See, e.g., United States v. Kohli, 847 F.3d 483, 486 (7th Cir. 2017) 
(affirming the conviction of a physician for violating the Controlled Substances 
Act); Koon v. Walden, 539 S.W.3d 752, 775 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017) (upholding a 
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exceeds the rate and severity of consequences that physicians 
have suffered.471  
Continuing the actions of manufacturers that overpromote 
and physicians who over-prescribe, patients expand the harmful 
effects of this product by over-consumption.472 The drug seeker 
who persuades a physician to write an opioid prescription for 
something other than physical pain is familiar to public health.473 
Refraining from blaming this category of patient, the medical 
ethicists Kelly Dineen and James DuBois take issue with the 
“duped” trope that faults physicians for believing complaints of 
severe pain.474 Dineen and Dubois report that efforts to train 
subjects to tell the difference between fake and real pain fail, and 
note the unfortunate finding of “a connection between emotional 
intelligence and susceptibility to deception.”475 A student author 
faults patients more overtly. Most of the harm of OxyContin, he 
notes, stemmed from deliberate misuse: consumers bought this 
drug in an illegal market and sought it for recreation.476 
According to litigation initiated around the country by both 
prosecutors in federal court and by cities and counties in state 
courts, pharmaceutical distributors expanded the harms of this 
                                                                                                     
$15,000,000 punitive damages award for negligent over-prescription of opioids); 
Doctor Gives Up License After Opioid Allegations, CHERRY HILL COURIER-POST 
(Apr. 17, 2018, 8:08 PM), https://perma.cc/Y9LH-AGS9 (last updated Apr. 20, 
2018, 1:07 PM) (last visited Oct. 17, 2019) (covering a physician who agreed to 
stop practicing medicine after being accused of recklessly prescribing 
painkillers) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 471.  See Opioid Overdose, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,  
https://perma.cc/P73H-24FW (last updated Dec. 19, 2018) (last visited Dec. 9, 
2019) (reporting that “on average, 130 Americans die every day from an opioid 
overdose”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 472.  See supra notes 427–428 and accompanying text. 
 473.  See, e.g., Kelly K. Dineen & James M. DuBois, Between a Rock and a 
Hard Place: Can Physicians Prescribe Opioids to Treat Pain Adequately While 
Avoiding Legal Sanction?, 42 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 9 (2016) (providing examples of  
“frequent flier” patients and those who fool physicians into prescribing pain 
medication with the intent to sell the prescription).  
 474.  See id. at 11 (defining a “duped” physician as one who “inadvertently 
supplies drugs to a drug abuser because the physician has been deceived by a 
drug abuser posing as a patient”). 
 475.  Id. at 13. 
 476.  See Prater, supra note 457, at 1411 (referencing West Virginia’s $10 
million settlement with Purdue Pharma for harms caused by Oxycontin’s 
recreational use). 
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drug.477 These businesses, plaintiffs claim, shipped excessive 
quantities of opioids to pharmacies in violation of the Controlled 
Substances Act,478 which required them to report suspicious 
orders.479 Mallinckrodt, Inc., McKesson Corporation, Kinray LLC, 
and Cardinal Health, Inc. all settled federal actions accusing 
them of violating this statute not only by failing to report, but by 
failing to implement an effective detection system (a lapse by 
Mallinckrodt),480 failing to abide by an earlier agreement with the 
federal government to monitor sales (McKesson),481 and violating 
state recordkeeping laws (Kinray and Cardinal Health).482  
Collateral effects. Whenever the rabies vaccine causes harm, 
this injury stops at the body of the one who takes it; the harm of 
opioids goes beyond a physical impact on one person.483 Take 
HIV. One study begins by noting that opioid dependence and HIV 
have been linked from the start in the United States, with heroin 
users at risk of contracting the virus from sharing and reusing 
                                                                                                     
 477.  See Haffajee & Mello, supra note 7, at 2302–03 (providing a summary 
of opioid litigation around the country); Sullivan, supra note 434 (summarizing 
lawsuits filed against opioid distributors and the subsequent allegations); see 
also Emmanuel & Thomas, supra note 463 (reporting federal drug trafficking 
charges brought against an opioid distributor).  
 478.  21 U.S.C. § 832 (2018). 
 479.  See id. (delineating the reporting requirements for pharmaceutical 
distributors). 
 480.  See Lenny Bernstein et al., Mallinckrodt Reaches Settlement with 
‘Bellwether’ Counties in Mammoth Opioid Lawsuit, WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2019, 
4:15 PM), https://perma.cc/B2BN-N42M (last visited Nov. 22, 2019) (“Under the 
deal, Mallinckrodt would pay [two Ohio] counties $24 million in cash and donate 
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the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 481.  See Haffajee & Mello, supra note 7, at 2303 (noting that McKesson’s 
settlement agreement included an agreement to modify its marketing and 
distribution practices). 
 482.  See Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Cardinal 
Health Agrees to $44 Million Settlement for Alleged Violations of the Controlled 
Substances Act (Dec. 23, 2016), https://perma.cc/SDQ5-4PVG (last visited Nov. 
22, 2019) (“[T]he Southern District of New York has entered into a separate 
settlement agreement . . . in which Cardinal agreed to resolve allegations that 
Kinray, Inc., a subsidiary distributor, failed to report suspicious orders by 
pharmacies in the Kinray service area.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 483.  See ALTARUM, supra note 426 (discussing the impact of opioid abuse on 
individuals, their families, the health care system, and society in general). 
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syringes.484 Heroin is not the only opioid, as we know, and this 
study went on to find that users of oxycodone (the generic name 
for the drug that started its life named OxyContin) had sex with 
more partners than did heroin users, a behavior the authors 
called high risk for the spread of HIV.485  Individuals who start 
their opioid use with prescriptions and then switch to injecting 
heroin move to a much riskier drug experience, as is taught in 
reverse by a United Nations study that found that substituting 
non-injected opioids for injected drugs lowered the risk of HIV 
transmission by fifty-four percent.486  
Just as the pathologies of prescription opioids are not limited 
to what they do to the human body when ingested, the drugs they 
enlist as agents of harm are not limited to their original 
incarnations. Dependency can follow from prescriptions that are 
too easy to obtain and renew;487 when crackdowns make this 
release harder to obtain lawfully, users move to cheaper and 
more accessible substitutes like heroin and illegal fentanyl.488 
Evidence supports this gateway-drug contention.489 Writing about 
                                                                                                     
 484.  See Christina S. Meade et al., HIV Risk Behavior in Opioid Dependent 
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the role of physicians as opioid over-prescribers, a psychiatrist 
adverts to a second gateway hypothesis: the possibility that a 
“fundamental biological mechanism based on the chemical 
composition of the [prescription opioid] drug itself” leads a user to 
move to street drugs.490 Illicit drug markets bring social harms 
beyond what the substances themselves do when ingested.491 
Another collateral consequence of prescription opioids has 
been significant in a nation where more than thirty percent of all 
persons, and more than forty percent of older adults, suffer from 
chronic pain.492 Centers for Disease Control guidelines published 
in 2016 steered physicians to prescribe lower doses of opioids493 at 
the same time that state laws, Medicare rules, and large 
pharmacy chains made prescriptions harder to refill.494 Anguish 
that would not have occurred but for the so-called opioid epidemic 
ensued and remains in place. A physician-neuroscientist notes 
the lamentable nature of this suffering: “While diversion and 
illicit use is real, the great majority of individuals abusing opioids 
(usually young people) are getting ‘high’ taking grandma’s 
Oxycontin®, stealing it or buying it from their friends or relatives 
and do not get them by prescription from an MD.”495 Constraints 
take prescriptions from people in physical distress.496 One news 
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story about the prescriptions crackdown quoted a nurse 
practitioner who decided to close her pain practice because she 
could no longer tolerate having to “choose between hurting 
patients by providing inadequate prescriptions and going to 
prison for exceeding CDC guidelines.”497 
Numerous other collateral effects have spread past 
individuals who used opioids themselves. Tens of thousands of 
children of addicted parents have gone to foster care.498 Fentanyl, 
which killed the popular musicians Prince and Tom Petty499 and 
which in its FDA-regulated version has functioned as both a 
gateway to illicit drugs and an alternative to prescribed opioid 
pills when they become unavailable,500 has street versions with 
names like Apache, China Girl, Dance Fever, and Murder 8. 
Street fentanyls dominate the death tally for this drug, which 
rose by 540% in the three years ending in 2016.501 One Brookings 
Institute study attributes to opioids about a fifth of the decline in 
men’s labor force participation since 2007.502 Another Brookings 
paper attributes extraordinary and unprecedented violence in the 
Mexico to north-of-the-border demand for opiates.503  
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The question of innovation. Pasteur innovated to make his 
vaccine;504 OxyContin was enough of a copycat not to deserve the 
patent that Purdue got for it.505 Dubious entitlement to be called 
novel is hardly the worst sin of this drug, but it warrants 
attention because innovation by the sector is so central to Pillar 
#4. Pharmaceutical companies profit from the notion that they 
work devotedly to offer the next cure.506  
Sometimes they do just that. Vaccines in general, not just the 
Pasteur exemplar, have made the world a healthier place.507 
Contemporary drugs for Hepatitis C offer another example.508 
Since 2014, treatment for this disease has moved from mostly 
failure to cures for the large majority of patients treated, with a 
new class of medications—direct-acting antivirals—earning the 
credit.509 At the other side of the ledger, next to OxyContin, sit 
numerous drugs approved by the FDA even though they do not 
make patients better off.510 Naming opioids as illustrative of 
prescription drugs fills in a mixed picture that has at least as 
much non-innovation in it as health-generating novelty. 
The question of effectiveness. Any assessment of a 
prescription drug’s safety necessarily must engage with its 
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effectiveness, the upside counterpart to the downside of 
inevitable risk. Rabies vaccines do a good job of warding off 
rabies.511 Opioids perform less well at their task of killing pain.512  
Evidence for this conclusion comes from a host of studies. 
Patients in Veterans Affairs primary clinics suffering from two 
types of chronic pain achieved no more relief from opioids than 
non-opioid drugs.513 Emergency room patients experiencing 
moderate to severe pain gained as much relief from 
acetaminophen and ibuprofen, also known by their brand names 
Tylenol and Advil, as they did from opioids.514 A significant 
minority of patients in another study, about twenty percent, 
reported that the opioids they took did not alleviate their pain; its 
author identified what he called “46 possible pathologic causes” 
for this ineffectiveness.515  
That opioids succeed in reducing pain when taken for 
extended periods is unlikely. A 2017 meta-analysis that reviewed 
sixty-seven studies examining eight intervention categories 
concluded that no published finding has ever compared long-term 
opioid therapy (defined as taking this medication for more than 
one year) with “placebo, no opioid, or nonopioid therapies.”516 One 
telling datum on the ineffectiveness of prescription opioids: 
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Although prescriptions have dropped in recent years, levels of 
reported pain are unchanged.517 
V. Conclusion 
Of all sources of physical injury to human bodies in the 
United States, the sector that occupies in this Article enjoys 
especially powerful shelter from legal accountability for the harm 
it causes.518 Prescription drugs unquestionably contribute to the 
public good. That value noted, the rule of law ought to extend to 
them.  Products liability law furnishes well-established causes of 
action to right this wrong.519  
Here, “the rule of law” means being within reach of legal 
sanctions. Products liability law governs products. A few 
categorical exceptions to products liability recourse do exist, but 
they are written explicitly into legislation. Guns and vaccines 
illustrate the category of explicit statutory immunity.520 The 
immunity enjoyed by prescription drugs is the opposite of explicit. 
Persons injured by one type of defective product turn out almost 
certain to gain nothing in court even though all products liability 
causes of action are in principle available to them.521  
Experience teaches that transparent immunity for 
prescription drugs can be achieved. Federal legislation 
addressing the closely related category of vaccine injury tells 
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claimants explicitly what they hold and lack by way of a 
remedy.522 Judicial readings of the vaccine statute have 
continued this clarity by stating that claims for design defect and 
failure to warn are expressly preempted.523 Even implied 
preemption of claims against drug manufacturers, though more 
veiled than the express kind, is clearer than the shadowy yet 
comprehensive immunity reported in this Article. Attorneys who 
represent plaintiffs and defendants in drug cases routinely 
prepare for the prospect of summary judgment based on 
preemption as an affirmative defense.524  
If products liability immunity for any object sold in commerce 
is a good idea, let that immunity be known and intelligible. If 
immunity is not desirable, then the object ought to face reckoning 
in the courts. This Article has moved toward better reckoning 
first by identifying (Almost) No Bad Drugs as a bottom-line result 
and then by setting out to find origins of this extraordinary state 
of the law. Near-total insulation from products liability had to be 
laid out in these pages because it is not bounded by any statute, 
regulation, judicial decision, or even another secondary writing.  
Supports for my conclusion of “(almost) no bad drugs” exist at 
three levels. First, numbers. Even the capacious criteria for 
inclusion that I used yielded only a few pharmaceutical products 
that have ever met with judicial condemnation in a personal 
injury action. Second, both decisional law and torts Restatements 
treat drug manufacturers with exceptional indulgence. The third 
and most elusive support needed the longest exposition in this 
Article. Pharmaceutical products, I argued, fare exceedingly well 
in personal-injury liability law because widely held beliefs about 
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the value of shelter from accountability prop them up. Even 
before one particular type of prescription drug inflicted 
catastrophic harm on American public health and welfare, these 
premises earned the questioning they received here. 
